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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
It was the law's year for public preoccupation. Whether the criminal
trial of famous figures or the investigation of terrorism's unspeakable
evils, law levied an unprecedented hold upon public attention. That
same intensity of exposure ran its course in local government law as
well. Whether judicial or legislative, a scrutiny of dominating proportions suffused Georgia's municipalities and counties in the spotlight of
public concern. This survey offers an account of that scrutiny.
I.

MUNICIPALITIES

A.

Annexation
Over time, the general assembly has authorized municipal annexation
by ordinance in a number of contexts.' The most recent authorization
applied to "unincorporated islands" within the municipality, areas
"consisting of 50 acres or less with... aggregate external boundaries
abutting the annexing municipality."2 A municipal effort at employing
that. authorization culminated in Culpepper v. City of Cordele.' The
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1. For perspective and analysis, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Law of Municipal
Annexation in Georgia: Evolution of A Concept?, 2 GA. L. REv. 35 (1967); Municipal
Annexation in Georgia: Nay-Sayers Beware, 5 GA. L. REv. 499 (1971); Municipal
Annexation in Georgia: The Contiguity Conundrum, 9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-90 to -92 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
3. 212 Ga. App. 890, 443 S.E.2d 642 (1994). The challenged annexations were but a
part of the municipality's attempt to identify and annex numerous separate areas of
unincorporated land "in a comprehensive effort to incorporate 'unincorporated islands'
contiguous to the existing corporate limits at the time of the annexation." Id. at 890, 443
S.E.2d at 643.
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case featured two unincorporated areas, each consisting of more than
fifty acres and traversed by a railroad right-of-way. Invalidating the
annexations, the court of appeals rejected the municipal position that the
right-of-way constituted a strip of municipal territory dividing the two
areas into four areas of less than fifty acres.4 Rather, the court found
no evidence that the right-of-way had ever been incorporated;' thus,
"the railroad right-of-way, along with the areas it traversed, formed two
unincorporated areas in excess of fifty acres,"' which the municipality
could not annex under the legislative authorization.7
The general assembly has been far less generous with its power of
municipal de-annexation; historically, the legislature itself exercised
that power through the passage of local statutes.' Lee v. City of Villa
Rica 0 illustrated the technique, as well as the striking results it can
entail. Lee presented a municipal mayor's challenge to a statute deannexing the area including the mayor's residence and thereby
disqualifying him for the office of mayor." Rejecting the challenger's
arguments that the statute constituted a bill of attainder 2 and that it

4. Id. at 892-93, 443 S.E.2d at 644-45.
[Tihe city's position is that the railroad right-of-way was an incorporated strip of
land providing a municipal boundary which divided the two unincorporated areas
exceeding fifty acres into four unincorporated areas, each containing less than fifty
acres, each contiguous to the existing corporate limits, and each qualifying for
annexation as an "unincorporated island" under Article 6.
Id. at 891, 443 S.E.2d at 643.
5. Id. at 891-92, 443 S.E.2d at 644. The court traced the rechartering of the
municipality in 1970, the undisputed unincorporated nature of the right-of-way at that
time, and the established fact that the area had not since been annexed by legislative or
municipal action. Id.
6. Id. at 890, 443 S.E.2d at 645. The court rejected the municipal argument that a
'de-facto annexation" of the right-of-way had occurred by way of "city police investigation
of incidents at public street crossings along the right-of-way, and... limited city police and
fire protection provided along the right-of-way as it abutted the city." Id. at 893, 443
S.E.2d at 64445.
7. Id. at 893, 443 S.E.2d at 645. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial judge's
decision validating the annexation. Id.
8. For perspective and analysis, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal De-Annexation:
The Ins and the Outs, 27 GA. ST. B.J. 118 (1991).
9. However, in 1994 the general assembly enacted legislation authorizing municipal
de-annexation upon application of the landowners involved. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-22 (1994 &
Supp. 1995).
10. 264 Ga. 606, 449 S.E.2d 295 (1994).
11. Id. at 606, 449 S.E.2d at 296. The municipal charter required that the mayor
reside in the city and "be registered and qualified to vote in city elections during his period
of service." Id., 449 S.E.2d at 297.
12. Id. at 607, 449 S.E.2d at 297. The court reasoned that "the de-annexation
legislation is not a bill of attainder because it neither singles out [the mayor] nor punishes
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unlawfully shortened his term of office,13 a unanimous supreme court
ordered the mayor to vacate the position. 4
B.

Officers and Employees

Litigation by and involving municipal officers and employees ranged
the spectrum during the survey period. The officer's oath of office

constituted the focal point of State v. Tullis, 5 a police officer's indictment for violation of his oath (a felony)16 by his committing the
misdemeanor theft of shoplifting. 17 Affirming the indictment's dismissal, the court of appeals refused to interpret the oath violation statute to
"render any commission of a misdemeanor by a police officer a felony."18

Rather, the court observed, "previous decisions uniformly require some
connection between the offense and the public officer's official duties." 9
A former police officer himself mounted the offensive in Terrell v.
Georgia Television Co.,20 an action in defamation for a television
broadcast on the occasion of plaintiff's resignation. 2
The action
charged defendant's reporter with quoting the municipal mayor's
characterization of certain funds as "unaccounted for" at a time when the

him as an officeholder." Id. The court concluded that "nothing on the face of the act
suggests punitive intent on the part of the legislature, and [the mayor] has not established
that the legislation was not a legitimate regulation of conduct." Id. at 608, 449 S.E.2d at
298.
13. Id. at 609, 449 S.E.2d at 299. Declaring the statute clear of O.C.G.A. § 1-3-11, the
court reasoned that the enactment "neither extinguished the office of mayor ... nor
modified the term of the office; rather, it, in conjunction with the city charter, only created
a vacancy in the office of mayor." 264 Ga. at 609, 449 S.E.2d at 299.
14. 264 Ga. at 609, 449 S.E.2d at 299. Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge's
declaration of the de-annexation statute's validity. Id.
15. 213 Ga. App. 581, 445 S.E.2d 282 (1994).
16. O.C.G.A. § 16-10-1 (1992). "Any public officer who wilfully and intentionally
violates the terms of his oath as prescribed by law, shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years." Id.
17. 213 Ga. App. at 581, 445 S.E.2d at 282. It was undisputed that the defendant had
violated the misdemeanor statute on shoplifting by taking a bar of candy from a store
without paying for it. Id. at 582, 445 S.E.2d at 282.
18. Id. at 582, 445 S.E.2d at 283. The court feared that otherwise a police officer "could
be subject to a felony prosecution for failure to obey a traffic signal.... or catching nine
rainbow trout, one more than the creel limit." Id.
19. Id. E.g., pawning a seized firearm to pay personal expenses; raping an arrested
motorist; appropriating government funds. Id.
20. 215 Ga. App. 150, 449 S.E.2d 897 (1994).
21. Id. at 150, 449 S.E.2d at 898, For perspective on, and analysis of, the subject, see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Defamation in Georgia Local Government Law: A Brief History, 16
GA. L. REV. 627 (1982).
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auditor had found the funds properly documented.2 2 Emphasizing the
"high standard of proof' required of public officials in suing the
media,2" the court held the reporter's reliance upon the mayor's
statement, as well as her failure to consult the city clerk, to fall short of
"actual malice." 4
Other employee dissatisfactions materialized in contests over
employment contracts. In Guthrie v. Dalton City School District,25 for
instance, plaintiff teacher sought breach-of-contract damages from the
municipal school board for its attempted rescission of a settlement
agreement.26 Refusing to permit the board to brandish its violation of
the Open Meetings Law27 as a means of voiding the agreement, the
court found no action contesting the violation within ninety days.28 In
the absence of such action, the alleged violation became immaterial, 9

22. 215 Ga. App. at 150-51, 449 S.E.2d at 898. Plaintiff also charged that a purported
retraction falsely indicated that the auditor's report came after the mayor's statement to
the reporter. Id. at 151, 449 S.E.2d at 898.
23. Id. at 151, 449 S.E.2d at 899. "[Tihere must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication." Id. "A public official in a defamation action must show actual malice with
'convincing clarity,' even on motion for summary judgment." Id. at 152, 449 S.E.2d at 899.
24. Id. "Even given the reporter's supposed knowledge of the mayor's alleged fear of
[the police officeri, her reliance on the mayor's statement as authoritative and her mere
failure to investigate his statement by consulting the city clerk do not establish bad faith,
much less 'actual malice,' even if a reasonably prudent person would have investigated."
Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment in favor of
defendant. Id. at 153, 449 S.E.2d at 900.
25. 213 Ga. App. 849, 446 S.E.2d 526 (1994).
26. Id. at 851, 446 S.E.2d at 528. Under the agreement, plaintiff had surrendered his
teaching certificate and resigned his teaching position in return for defendants' agreement
to employ him in a noncertified position for the additional year required for plaintiffs
retirement benefits. Id. at 850, 446 S.E.2d at 527.
27. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1994). The board alleged that its approval of the
agreement occurred in a meeting which violated the statute and thus suffered the statute's
declaration that "[any resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, or other official action of an
agency adopted, taken, or made at a meeting which is not open to the public as required
by this chapter shall not be binding." 213 Ga. App. at 851, 446 S.E.2d at 528 (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b) (1994)).
28. 213 Ga. App. at 852, 446 S.E.2d at 529. That requirement also appears in O.C.G.A.
§ 50-14-1(b), leading the court to conclude that "the question becomes whether '[any action
contesting' the alleged violation, 'commenced within 90 days of the date such contested
action was taken."' 213 Ga. App. at 852, 446 S.E.2d at 528-29.
29. 213 Ga. App. at 852,446 S.E.2d at 529. The court rejected defendants' position that
a later board meeting, at which plaintiffs employment request was deferred, amounted to
a "contesting action." Said the court: "While the Board's statement released at the
meeting suggested that further action was appropriate in order to comply with the law,
this did not amount to a conclusion that any violation had already taken place." Id.
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and "the superior court erred in granting the movant defendants' motion
for partial summary judgment.""°
The litigating teacher in King v. Board of Education of Buford31

sought to mandamus32 the board to honor her contract as school band
director until providing her a hearing under the Georgia Fair Dismissal
Law.33 Rejecting plaintiff's efforts,' a majority of the court of appeals
focused precisely upon the position of "band director."35 Relying upon
evidence from the State Professional Standards Commission, 6 the court
determined that "the position of 'band director' is not in itself a distinct
'position' affording [plaintiff] the procedural protections of the Fair
37
Dismissal Law."

30. Id. The court also found the board possessed of authority to make the settlement
agreement, but deemed further evidence necessary for a determination on the validity of
the board's additional agreement to expunge certain records. Id. at 852-53. 446 S.E,2d at
529.

31. 214 Ga. App. 325, 447 S.E.2d 657 (1994).
32. Id. at 325, 447 S.E.2d at 658. The court was at pains to consider the supreme
court's transfer of the case as approving the mandamus procedure itself. "Therefore, we
do not consider procedural matters militating against mandamus relief in particular...."
Id. at 326, 447 S.E.2d at 658. For extensive discussion of those "matters," see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1989).

33. O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-940 to -2020 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
34. 214 Ga. App. at 326, 447 S.E.2d at 659. "[Plaintiff) essentially contends that the
Board's decision not to reassign her as the school's 'band director' after having assigned
those duties to her for the previous four years is a 'demotion' within the meaning of the
Fair Dismissal Law. We are constrained to disagree." Id.
35. Id. at 327, 447 S.E.2d at 659. Refusal of the status was not one, the court
explained, within the meaning of being demoted "from one position in the school system
to another." Id.
36. Id. "That body has declined to establish the position of 'band director' as a
cognizable tenured position. This is a matter within the Commission's lawful discretion."
Id.
37. Id. The court flatly rejected plaintiffs position "that, over time, a teacher may
attain a property right in any extracurricular undertaking he or she is allowed to pursue
if additional compensation is received as a result." Id. Chief Judge Pope, Presiding Judge
McMurray, and Judges Blackburn and Banke dissented. Id. at 328, 447 S.E.2d at 660
(McMurray, P.J., dissenting).
In the survey period decision in Dowling v. Atlanta City School Dist., 216 Ga. App. 688,
455 S.E.2d 399 (1995), the court of appeals overruled Henderson v. Sherrington, 189 Ga.
App. 498, 376 S.E.2d 397 (1988), and held that
at least where it takes a § 1983 action to effect a postdeprivation remedy, a
plaintiff [school district employee] with the right to a predeprivation hearing does
not lose her § 1983 and § 1988 claims for damages and attorney fees once a
postdeprivation remedy is effectuated. It follows that plaintiff may pursue her
claims for damages and attorney fees.
216 Ga. App. at 691, 455 S.E.2d at 402.
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C. Power
The period's "power" controversies required the supreme court to
review a variety of municipal endeavors to obtain revenue. City of
Calhoun v. North Georgia Electric Membership Corp.38 featured a
municipal effort to collect a street franchise fee from a "secondary
supplier" of electricity. 9 Conceding municipal authority under the
Georgia Electric Service Territorial Act4 to impose a reasonable fee
upon the supplier,4 ' the court found flaws in the city's exercise of that
authority.4 2 As for an express contract, the court emphasized the
municipal ordinance's requirement that the supplier provide written
acceptance of the charge within ninety days. Given the supplier's
steadfast refusal of acceptance, the ordinance's condition was never
fulfilled, and no contract ever existed.43 As for quasi-contract recovery,
the court could find no "implied promise" on the part of the supplier"
and no "reasonable expectation" on the part of the municipality.45 "The
City cannot rely upon its own unilateral act of continuing to allow its
streets to be used and occupied as evidence of an enforceable implied
promise on the part of NGEMC to pay a franchise fee which NGEMC
has expressly rejected."4 6 For the supplier's use of the streets to date,
therefore, the municipality could recover no franchise fee.47

38. 264 Ga. 205, 443 S.E.2d 469 (1994).
39. Id. at 205, 443 S.E.2d at 470. The municipality itself was the "primary supplier."
Id., 443 S.E.2d at 469.
40. O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-1 to -541 (1992).
41. Interpreting the statute, the court observed that "[tihe clear import of this language
is that 'any secondary supplier' can be charged a 'sum of money' for a street franchise."
264 Ga. at 207, 443 S.E.2d at 471. Further, "'any secondary supplier' cannot avoid
payment of a franchise fee simply because the 'municipality' pays 'itself no franchise fee
in its additional capacity as the 'primary supplier.'" Id.
42. Id. at 210, 443 S.E.2d at 473. The court said that defendant's subjection to a
franchise fee "does not establish that the City is necessarily entitled to recover the 4%
franchise fee that it seeks in the instant case." Id. at 207, 443 S.E.2d at 471.
43. Id. at 208, 443 S.E.2d at 471. "Thus, the City's offer contemplated the creation of
an enforceable contract by NGEMC's timely 'written acceptance' which was never
forthcoming. It follows that an express contract obligating NGEMC to pay the City the 4%
franchise fee was never created." Id.
44. Id. at 209, 443 S.E.2d at 472. "Indeed, NGEMC has, at all times, unequivocally
apprised the City that no payment of a franchise fee would ever be forthcoming." Id.
45. Id. "Under the undisputed evidence, the City has never had a reasonable
expectation that any payment for street franchise rights would be received from NGEMC."
Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. "It follows that the City cannot recover a franchise fee for the use and
occupancy of its streets to date, since there is presently no enforceable contractual
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The municipality reacted to the supreme court's decision by enacting
a second ordinance levying a four percent gross receipts tax upon the
secondary supplier. When the supplier refused to pay, the parties again
came before the court under the style of North Georgia Electric
Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun.4" This time, the supplier argued
its exemption from the tax as a "franchise" of the Tennessee Valley
Authority ('TVA") and as an "instrumentality" of the federal government. Rejecting both characterizations, a unanimous court held that the
TVA contract constituted the supplier neither a "franchise"4 nor a
federal "instrumentality." '° The court also rejected an argument of
unconstitutionality:51 "The creation, by Ordinance No. 493, of a
subclass of secondary suppliers not paying a franchise fee under
Ordinance 361 cannot be said to be an unreasonable classification."52
A distinctively different issue under the Georgia Electric Service
Territorial Act surfaced in Athens-Clarke County v. Walton Electric
Membership Corp.53 There, a "unified government" sought to establish
its power to impose a street franchise fee upon an EMC operating in the
formerly unincorporated area of the county.'
The supreme court
approached the issue by emphasizing that the unified government's
charter expressly declared the created entity to be both a "county" and

agreement which obligates NGEMC to pay such a fee." Id.
48. 264 Ga. 769,450 S.E.2d 410 (1994). The ordinance imposed the tax upon secondary
suppliers not otherwise paying a franchise fee. The EMC brought the action for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 769, 450 S.E.2d at 411.
49. Id. at 771, 450 S.E.2d at 412. Relying upon non-Georgia decisions, the court
reasoned that "the legislative history of [the TVA statute] leads to the conclusion that
cooperatives, such as NGEMC, were never intended by Congress to be exempted from state
and local taxation." Id.
50. Id. at 773, 450 S.E.2d at 413. "[Tjhis Court is not persuaded that NGEMC's right
and privilege to distribute electric power purchased by it from the TVA pursuant to that
contract renders NGEMC an instrumentality of the federal government exempted from
State and local taxation." Id.
51. Id. at 774, 450 S.E.2d at 414. Plaintiff argued that the ordinance created an
arbitrary classification, thus violating the uniformity requirement of GA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1, para. 3. 264 Ga. at 773, 450 S.E.2d at 413.
52. 264 Ga. at 774, 450 S.E.2d at 414. "A classification based upon the payment of
another tax or franchise does not render the classification unreasonable." Id. at 773, 450
S.E.2d at 414. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for the
municipality. Id. at 774, 450 S.E.2d at 414.
53. 265 Ga.229, 454 S.E.2d 510 (1995).
54. Id. at 229, 454 S.E.2d at 511. Prior to unification, the municipality could not
impose fees in the county's unincorporated areas, and the EMC refused to acknowledge the
unified government's power to enter into franchise agreements in those areas. Id.
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a "municipal corporation."55 As such, the court deemed the entity a
"municipality" as empowered by the Electric Service Act to assess
franchise fees upon the EMC.56 Moreover, the court concluded, the
government's adoption of an ordinance imposing a reasonable fee,
followed by the EMC's continued use of the streets, obligated payment
despite the absence of a formal "agreement."57
A final "power" conflict arose in Morton v. Bell,5" a funeral escort
service's effort to prevent municipal police officers from using municipal
motorcycles in providing a private escort service. Relying exclusively
upon the municipal code, a unanimous court noted a general prohibition
upon the use of city vehicles for noncity business.5 9 Yet another
provision prohibited use of city equipment, except for police uniforms, in
outside employment.6" Engaging the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the court interpreted the latter prohibition to cover
vehicles.6 ' Accordingly, the court reversed the trial judge's refusal to
honor plaintiff's request for a mandamus.6 2

55. Id. The court observed that the unification was sanctioned by GA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 3, para. 2(a), and its charter was granted in 1990 GA. LAws § 1-101, 3560. That charter
declared that the government "shall be deemed to be both a municipal corporation and a
county throughout the total territory of said government." 265 Ga. at 229, 454 S.E.2d at
511.
56. 265 Ga. at 229, 454 S.E.2d at 511-12. The court termed the unified government "a
hybrid," and said that although the former county continued to exist as a political
subdivision, "the county's continued existence does not mean that the new hybrid form of
government is a county .... Because the new political entity is something other than a
county, it falls within the Act's definition of a 'municipality.'" Id. at 230,454 S.E.2d at 512.
57. Id. at 232, 454 S.E.2d at 513. The court reversed the court of appeals decision in
the case, 211 Ga. App. 232,439 S.E.2d 504 (1993), holding that the unified government was
not a "municipality" within the meaning of the Electric Service Act. 265 Ga. at 232, 454
S.E.2d at 413.
58. 264 Ga. 832, 452 S.E.2d 103 (1995).
59. Id. at 832, 452 S.E.2d at 103. See ATLANTA, GA. CITY CODE § 5-4026(a). This
section required that "vehicles must be used solely and exclusively for municipal purposes."
60. ATLANTA, GA. CITY CODE, CIVIL SERVICE RuLEs AND REGULATIONS, ch. XVI, § 1(7)
(1990).
61. 264 Ga. at 833, 452 S.E.2d at 104. The court reasoned that express exemption of
uniforms, but no exemption for vehicles, meant that the "rule does prohibit the use of City
police vehicles in outside employment." Id.
62. Id. Justice Fletcher concurred specially to register doubt that a municipality could
expressly authorize the challenged practice: "The use of public property for purely private
gain is contrary to this interest [use of public property only for public interest] and any
attempt by a municipality to authorize such use would be void as against public policy."
Id. at 834, 452 S.E.2d at 104 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
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D.

Regulation
Municipalities manifested diverse regulatory concerns during the
survey period.13 Discotheque, Inc. v. City Council of Augusta" presented one of those concerns via an ordinance purporting to regulate
adult entertainment on premises licensed to serve or sell alcoholic
beverages. The municipality, seeking the supreme court's affirmance of
a favorable summary judgment, relied upon a prior decision approving
virtually the same ordinance. 6 Rebuffing that analogy, the court
explained that' the earlier case involved only one of three mandated
requirements.66 In this case, the court delineated, the municipal
movant for summary judgment must clear the ordinance under all three
"tests."67 Discounting the ordinance's preamble aspiration of reducing
criminal activity and deterioration of neighborhoods, the court insisted
upon evidence that "criminal activity and deterioration of neighborhoods
were, in fact, pernicious secondary effects of adult entertainment
establishments." s The court reached the same conclusion as to the
ordinance's expressed reliance upon the experience of other localities:
"In the absence of probative evidence of the 'experience' of other
municipalities and counties,

...

summary judgment would not be

appropriate." 9

63. For perspective and general analysis, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Georgia
Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to
Prohibit in Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV, 115 (1974); Local Government
Law and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981); 'Ascertainable
Standards"vs. "UnbridledDiscretion" in Local Government Regulation,GA. COUNTY Gov.
MAGAZINE, Dec. 1989, at 19.
64. 264 Ga. 623, 449 S.E.2d 608 (1994).
65. Id. at 623,449 S.E.2d at 609 (citing S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County, 263 Ga. 267,
430 S.E.2d 726 (1993)).

66, Id. at 624, 449 S.E.2d at 609. The court extracted from Paramount Pictures Corp.
v. Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 297 S.E.2d 250 (1982), the following "tripartite test" for

determining the validity of such an ordinance: "(1) if it furthers an important government
interest; (2) if that government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and, (3)
if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that government interest." 264 Ga. at 623, 449 S.E.2d at 609. In S.J.T, Inc., said the

court, only the third "test" was in dispute. Id.
67. 264 Ga, at 623, 449 S.E.2d at 609. The municipality must show "that no genuine
issue of material fact remained as to any of the three requirements in the Paramounttest."
Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 624, 449 S.E.2d at 609. The court conceded that these "are important
government interests which are unrelated to the suppression of speech." Id.
69. Id. Thus, the court reversed the summary judgment for the municipality. Id. at
625, 449 S.E.2d at 610.
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The court tendered similar disposition to the ordinance at issue in
Quetgles v. City of Columbus, 0 an ordinance prohibiting modeling
sessions, sexual displays, and close mingling between customers and
employees in adult entertainment establishments. Reversing the grant
of the municipality's motion to dismiss,71 the court found no city
evidence showing the ordinance to further an important government
interest unrelated to free speech."2
Other regulatory concerns emerged in City of Atlanta v. McKinney,73
featuring municipal ordinances "that prohibit discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, establish a domestic partnership registry for jail
visitation, and extend insurance and other employee benefits to domestic
partners of city employees."74 The court examined each measure
against the city's home rule power to enact "clearly reasonable"
ordinances "relating to its property, affairs, and local government for
which no provision has been made by general law and which are not
inconsistent with the Constitution."7 5 In that context, the court
experienced little difficulty in sustaining the "jail registry" ordinance,
"merely the mechanism by which the city can identify the residents and
employees who may exercise their jail visitation rights because of their
declaration as domestic partners."76 Similarly, the court employed both
police power7" and state authorization7 8 to approve the "anti-discrimi70. 264 Ga. 708, 450 S.E.2d 677 (1994).
71. Id. at 709, 450 S.E.2d at 678. Plaintiff had challenged the constitutionality of the
ordinance, and the trial court had granted the municipal motion to dismiss. Id. at 708,450
S.E.2d at 678.
72. Id. The court again extracted the tripartite test from ParamountPictures,Inc., and
relied upon its decision in Discotheque,Inc. Id.
Justice Fletcher, joined by Justice Hunstein, concurred because of the court's unanimous
decision in Discotheque, Inc., but announced that he had changed his mind and now
deemed the preamble sufficient to uphold that ordinance. In this case, however, the
ordinance possessed no preamble. Id. (Fletcher, J., concurring).
73. 265 Ga. 161, 454 S.E.2d 517 (1995).
74. Id. at 161, 454 S.E.2d at 519.
75. Id. at 163, 454 S.E.2d at 520 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(a)). For history and
analysis of the Georgia home rule system, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Home Rule Benefits or
Homemade Problemsfor GeorgiaLocal Government?, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 317 (1968); Home Rule:
Its Impact on Georgia Local Government, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 277 (1972); Local Government
Home Rule: A Place to Stop?, 12 GA. L. REV. 805 (1978); The United States Supreme Court
as Home Rule Wrecker, 34 MERCER L. REV. 363 (1982).
76. 265 Ga. at 164, 454 S.E.2d at 520. The court found municipal charter power to
operate and maintain its jails, and that the registry ordinance was "a reasonable exercise
of the city's power," and reasonably "related to the city's affairs." Id.
77. Id. at 165, 454 S.E.2d at 521. "Under its police power, a city may enact ordinances
to protect the health, safety and general welfare of the public." Id.
78. Id. The court cited O.C.G.A. § 36-34-2(2) as providing "additional authority for a
city to enact equal employment opportunity laws prohibiting discrimination in city govern-
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nation" ordinances, "prohibiting discrimination in city government." 9
"[Tihey are reasonable laws related to the city's affairs and local

government.""° The court's problem came with the third ordinance, the
measure "recognizing domestic partners as 'a family relationship' and

providing employee benefits to them 'in a comparable manner ...as for
a spouse.'""1 Although home rule provisions authorize insurance
benefits for municipal employees and their "dependents,"" the court
held that "[d]omestic partners do not meet any of these [general statute]
definitions of dependent."" Under the long ordained precept of strictly
construing municipal power, the court declared the benefits ordinance
"ultra vires under the home rule act and the Georgia Constitution. " '
E.

Openness

Open meetings and open records, the "sunshine" companions, claim an
eventful history in Georgia local government law. 5 The survey period
included a decision by the court of appeals on each component.

ment." 265 Ga. at 165, 454 S.E.2d at 521 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-34-2(2) (1993 & Supp.
1995)).
79. 265 Ga. at 165, 454 S.E.2d at 521. "The ordinances prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination in city employment, artist selection, festival admission,. . . and vehicles for
hire." Id. at 161-62, 454 S.E.2d at 519.
80. Id. at 166, 454 S.E.2d at 522.
81. Id. at 165, 454 S.E.2d at 521.
82. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-4(a) (1993). "The issue here is whether the city impermissibly
expanded the definition of dependent to include domestic partners." 265 Ga. at 164, 454
S.E.2d at 521.
83. 265 Ga. at 164-65, 454 S.E.2d at 521. "[O]ther state statutes define a dependent
either as a spouse, child, or one who relies on another for financial support." Id. at 164,
454 S.E.2d at 521.
84. Id. at 165, 454 S.E.2d at 521. The court relied upon GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para.
4, prohibiting special laws on rights or status of private persons, and prohibiting special
laws on matters provided for by general statutes. 265 Ga. at 164, 454 S.E.2d at 520.
Justice Carley dissented only as to the court's approval of the jail registry ordinance and
the anti-discrimination ordinances: "The registry ordinance creates a parallel institution
to marriage, and the sexual orientation ordinances expand the classes of people protected
from discrimination by state and federal law." Thus, "the City exceeded its authority under
the Georgia Constitution and under Georgia's Home Rule Act." Id. at 171, 454 S.E.2d at
525 (Carley, J., concurring & dissenting).
Justice Sears, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Hunt and Justice Hunstein,
dissented only on the court's invalidation of the "employee benefits" ordinance: "There is
no general law in this state establishing a uniform definition of 'dependent,'.. . and the
requirements of a domestic partnership certainly indicate that a city employee's domestic
partner must rely, at least in part, on the employee for financial support." 265 Ga. at 167,
454 S.E.2d at 522 (Sears, J., concurring & dissenting).
85. For an account, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness" in Local
Gouernment Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97 (1978).
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6
Regarding open meetings, Jersawitz v. Fortson8
presented a citizens
complaint against a municipal housing authority for exclusion from a
meeting of the "Olympic Task Force Selection Committee." 7 Although

the Committee was not created by the housing authority, eight of the
fifteen individuals present were authority people;' and the meeting's
purpose was to review bids for revitalization of an authority develop-

ment. 9

Rejecting the authority's denial of coverage by the Open

Meetings Law,90 the court reasoned that the Committee was formed

"with the knowledge and approval" of the authority and was the
authority's "vehicle" for carrying out its responsibilities."' Additionally,

the court held, a videotape of the meeting fell short of substantial
compliance with the statute.92
As for open records, City of Brunswick v. Atlanta Journal& Constitution93 contested municipal refusal to honor newspaper requests for

incident reports on a series of sexual assaults.

Affirming the trial

judge's disposition, the court found no error in requiring production of
any portion of the reports after exclusion of other portions.94 Addition-

ally, the court held that "incident reports can be exempted from
disclosure if disclosure would reveal confidential information or endanger
the lives of various individuals." 95

86. 213 Ga. App. 796, 446 S.E.2d 206 (1994).
87. Id. at 796, 446 S.E.2d at 207. Plaintiff complained of the authority's violation of
the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1994).
88. 213 Ga. App. at 797, 446 S.E.2d at 207. Three others were city employees. Id.
89. Id. The revitalization project was a part of the preparation for the 1996 Olympic
Games; the housing authority maintained that the project "would enhance the quality of
life of residents within that neighborhood." Id., 446 S.E.2d at 207-08.
90. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1994).
91. 213 Ga. App. at 799, 446 S.E.2d at 208. "[T]he... gathering was a meeting within
the purview of the Open Meetings Act." Id., 446 S.E.2d at 209.
92. Id. The court reasoned that "viewing an edited videotape of the meeting after the
fact is not the equivalent of being present and having an opportunity to provide input to
decision-makers on a project such as this. . . " Id. The court reversed the trial judge's
summary judgment in favor of the housing authority. Id. at 800, 446 S.E.2d at 209.
93. 214 Ga. App. 150, 447 S.E.2d 41 (1994), aftd, 265 Ga. 413. The case was brought
under the Open Records Act. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
94. 214 Ga. App. at 152, 447 S.E.2d at 43. Thus, the court rejected the city's argument
that the trial judge erred in requiring any portion of the reports once he determined that
portions must be excluded. Id.
95. Id. at 153, 447 S.E.2d at 44. Thus, the court rejected the newspapers' argument
that incident reports could not be excluded because of their exclusion from exemption
under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4). 214 Ga. App. at 152,447 S.E.2d at 44. See O.C.G.A. § 5018-72(aX4) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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Property
Like most entities municipalities lay claim to real property and may
be expected to defend that claim against attack. Illustrating an
6
unsuccessful defense, Giddens v. Barreitine1
pitted town against
owners of property abutting an abandoned railroad right-of-way.
Examining the town's claim to the right-of-way under a deed from the
railroad,9" the supreme court also reviewed an 1870 deed conveying the
right-of-way to the railroad. 98 The latter instrument, the court held,
created either an "easement" or a "determinable fee."99 If an easement,
then the railroad's abandonment left it with no transferable interest. If
a determinable fee, the deed's "habendum clause" employed abandonment to trigger an express reverter. In either event, the court concluded, the adjoining property owners' claim trumped the railroad's deed to
the municipality."°
G.

Liability
Typically, municipal liability litigation rang most of the changes. 01
The period's "function approach" illustration came in Steinberg v. City
of Atlanta,1 2 an action for personal injuries to a ballet patron who fell
over a rope in the civic center's parking lot."10 Affirming a verdict for
the municipality, the court of appeals intoned the familiar precept of
governmental immunity for facilities operated primarily for the public
benefit rather than as a source of revenue. Noting plaintiff's proof of
money derived from the center's commercial bookings, the court termed

96.

264 Ga. 510, 448 S.E.2d 441 (1994).

97. Id. at 510, 448 S.E.2d at 442. Upon I.C.C. approval of its abandonment, the
railroad had executed a quitclaim deed to the town. Id.
98. Id. at 511, 448 S.E.2d at 442. The plaintiff abutting property owners claimed
ownership as successors in title to this original grantor. Id.
99. Id., 448 S.E.2d at 443.
100. Id. at 511-12, 448 S.E.2d at 443.
101. For orientation, perspective, and general chronology, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Georgia Local Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
19 (1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
102. 213 Ga. App. 491, 444 S.E.2d 873 (1994).
103. Id. at 491, 444 S.E.2d at 873. The rope had been strung for the purpose of traffic
control. Id.
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that revenue "'incidental' in view of the evidence that the Civic Center
1°4
operates at an annual loss and is subsidized by [the municipality]."
The plaintiff in Brumbelow v. City of Rome' attempted to engage
the traditional exception to municipal immunity triggered by negligently
defective sidewalks.16 Against plaintiff's allegations of a defect
appearing "to have been there for a significant time,"10 7 the court
balanced municipal affidavits of continuous inspections and the absence
of complaints or repairs on the right-of-way. Without some evidence of
actual knowledge of the time of the defect's existence, the court held,
plaintiff fell victim to a motion for summary judgment.'
Liability insurance reared its countenance in McLemore v. City
Council of Augusta,ic9 an action for plaintiff's injuries in an automobile
collision with a police officer."' Holding existing municipal insurance
sufficiently authorized by the motor vehicle insurance statute,"' the
court asserted that "the city can be held liable for the alleged negligence
of [the police officer) to the limits of its insurance policy ....
Under that policy, however, the municipality had obtained coverage only
for claims exceeding $250,000."3 Accordingly, in the absence of
sufficient evidence of additional insurance coverage,"" the court held

104. Id. at 494,444 S.E.2d at 875. "The fact that the Civic Center is leased on occasion
by commercial entities at commercial rates does not alter 'the over-all character of the
[Civic Center as a facility] primarily for the benefit of the public, rather than primarily as
a source of revenue for the City.'" Id. (quoting City of Atlanta v. Chambers, 205 Ga. App.
834, 836, 424 S.E.2d 19 (1992)).
105. 215 Ga. App. 321, 450 S.E.2d 345 (1994).
106. Id. at 321, 450 S.E.2d at 346. For treatment of the street and sidewalk exception
to the rule of municipal immunity, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL
TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 62-117 (4th ed. 1988).

107. 215 Ga. App. at 321, 450 S.E.2d at 346. The plaintiff alleged no actual knowledge
of the hole in the right-of-way on the part of the city but argued that the grass surrounding
the hole indicated a period of time sufficient to raise an issue of constructive knowledge.
Id. at 321-22, 450 S.E.2d at 346.
108. Id. at 322, 450 S.E.2d at 346. The court said that an inference sufficient to oppose
a motion for summary judgment must rest upon facts rather than mere conclusions, Id.
109. 212 Ga. App. 862, 443 S.E.2d 505 (1994).
110. Id. at 862, 443 S.E.2d at 506. Plaintiffs also sued the officer himself. Id.
111. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1990). Although termed a "general liability policy," the court
held that the policy's language was sufficient to encompass claims arising from automobile
collisions. 212 Ga. App. at 863, 443 S.E.2d at 507. Said the court: "It is the nature of the
insurance coverage provided by a policy rather than title of the policy which determines
if it is a policy within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51." 212 Ga. App. at 863, 443
S.E.2d at 507.
112. 212 Ga. App. at 863, 443 S.E.2d at 507.
113. Id. The excess limits of the policy were undisputed. Id. at 864,443 S.E.2d at 507.
114. Id. Plaintiffs had not met their burden "as they did not present evidence that the
city has insurance coverage other than the policy which covers claims in excess of
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the
the city's waiver of immunity limited to "amounts exceeding
115
minimum threshold of the insurance coverage of $250,000."
Earnheartv. Scott 11 6 gave instance to the period's "nuisance" endeavor. 17 There, plaintiff alleged injuries from an accident caused by
standing water on a municipal road, the result of a defective sewerdrainage system. 18 Recounting proffers of evidence on both sides of
the case," 9 the court assessed plaintiff's efforts as insufficient "to
controvert the City's evidence that it had no notice or knowledge of the
alleged defect." 20
A more successful effort to circumvent immunity culminated in Mayor
of Savannah v. Wilson,121 an action under Section 1983 of the Federal
Civil Rights Act.' 2 2 There, plaintiffs charged improper municipal
arrest procedures amounting to "policy or custom" violations of the
statute.1 23 In its review of the case, the court emphasized "uncontrovertId.
$250,000."
115. Id. at 865, 443 S.E.2d at 508. The court conceded that the excess limits policy
waiver "creates an anomalous result by allowing the plaintiff to recover only damages
exceeding $250,000." Id. at 864 n.1, 443 S.E.2d at 507 n.1.
116. 213 Ga. App. 188, 444 S.E.2d 128 (1994).
117. 213 Ga. App. at 188, 444 S.E.2d at 128. For consideration of the "nuisance"
exception to municipal immunity, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT
LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 117-34 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Liability in

Georgia: The "Nuisance"Nuisance, 12 GA. ST. B.J. 11 (1975); Georgia County Liability:
Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1991).
118. 213 Ga. App. at 188, 444 S.E.2d at 129. Plaintiff alleged that the water caused
her car to hydroplane and strike a vehicle in the opposite lane of traffic. Id.
119. Id. Plaintiffs tender included other accidents in the vicinity, a city work order for
drainage repairs in the area, and the affidavit of a nearby home owner attesting to
standing water in front of his house during rains. The municipality countered with
evidence of no reports of any problems at the location of plaintiffs accident. Id.
120. Id. at 190, 444 S.E.2d at 130. Affirming summary judgment for the municipality,
the court noted that most of the accidents reported by plaintiff occurred after plaintiffs
accident, none involved standing water, and one accident occurring prior to plaintiffs
accident which did involve standing water occurred in a different block. Id. at 189, 444
S.E.2d at 129.
121. 214 Ga. App. 170, 447 S.E.2d 124 (1994).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). For perspective on this statute, and treatment of its
impact upon Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAw's ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW "PERSONS"
(1984).
123. 214 Ga. App. at 171, 447 S.E.2d at 126. The court elaborated the meaning of the
statute as follows:
If a municipality's failure to train its employees demonstrates a "deliberate
indifference" to the rights of its inhabitants, as where a deliberate choice is made
to follow a course of action from among various alternatives, then it can be
thought of as a "policy or custom" and municipal liability attaches.
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ed evidence" of no probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours of
arrest,2 4 as well as a de facto policy of such practice on weekends." 2
Second, the court also focused upon allegations that the city deliberately
withheld exculpatory information from the district attorney despite
the
plaintiffs' "Brady motion."12 This evidence and these allegations,
127
court held, precluded summary judgment for the municipality.
Two decisions of the period pivoted upon the statutory "ante litem"
notice mandate. 128 One of those, Clark v. City of Smyrna,129 simply
confirmed prior principles. The plaintiff in the case had telephoned his
claim to a municipal employee at city hall and then worked with the
city's insurance adjuster to whom employees referred the claim. 30
Plaintiff argued both "substantial compliance" with the notice requirement and municipal estoppel. 3 ' Rejecting those arguments, the court
recounted decisions that formal written notice is a condition precedent
to an action, that oral notice is no notice, and that reference to an
insurer creates no estoppel. 11 2 "It is well established that governing
133
officials cannot waive statutory ante litem notice requirements."
The second decision, that by the supreme court in City of Chamblee v.
There the court reasoned
Maxwell, 34 overruled prior principles,'

124. Id. This, the court noted, constituted a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62. 214 Ga.
App. at 171, 447 S.E.2d at 126. See O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62 (1990)..
125. 214 Ga. App. at 171, 447 S.E.2d at 126. "That evidence, and the inferences drawn
from it, precluded summary [judgment] of [plaintiff's] § 1983 claim." Id.
126. Id. The court observed that "liability can be imposed under certain circumstances
by a policy of failing to properly train employees about Brady material or issuing
appropriate guidelines as to what constitutes Brady material," and that "the city's
guidelines for its employees to 'follow the law' amounted to no guidance at all." Id. at 17172, 447 S.E.2d at 126.
127. Id. at 172, 447 S.E.2d at 126. The court thus affirmed the trial court's action. Id.
128. For both history and analysis of the statute, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 145-74 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,

Georgia Municipal Tort Liability: Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA. L. REV. 134 (1969); Ante Litem
Notice: Cause for Pause, URBAN GA. 24 (Oct. 1978).
129. 212 Ga. App. 598, 442 S.E.2d 461 (1994).
130. Id. at 598, 442 S.E.2d at 461. The plaintiff complained of injuries allegedly
suffered in a fall on a defective city sidewalk; the plaintiff completed and returned forms
sent him by the insurance adjuster; and the insurer eventually notified plaintiff that his
claim had been denied. Id. at 598-99, 442 S.E.2d at 461.
131. Id. at 599, 442 S.E.2d at 461.
132. Id., 442 S.E.2d at 462. The court relied upon its decisions in Gillingwateru. City
of Valdosta, 177 Ga. App. 241, 339 S.E.2d 287 (1985) and Brown u. City of Chamblee, 211
Ga. App. 145, 438 S.E.2d 396 (1993).
133. 212 Ga. App. at 599, 442 S.E.2d at 462. The court thus affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the city. Id.
134. 264 Ga. 635, 452 S.E.2d 488 (1994).
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that "[a] claim for continuing trespass ...is predicated upon the
happening of a continuous series of 'events,''" 6 and that "each day
that the trespass continues necessarily begins another six-month period
during which ante litem notice must be given." 37 The court employed
those premises to conclude that "a property owner who incurs damage
as a result of a continuing nuisance or trespass maintained by a
municipality is entitled, within the four-year period of limitations, to
recover only those damages incurred during the six months preceding
the giving of such notice."13
The court of appeals took Groves v. City of Atlanta 39 as an occasion
for reemphasizing the precise relation between municipal government
and punitive damages. Specifically, the court rejected an argument that
the municipality's immunity to punitive damages had been waived by its
contractor's liability insurance.14 ° Because the city's freedom from
punitive damages is a decree of "public policy" and not a result of
sovereign immunity," the court explained, no waiver operated. 142
In Mixon v. City of Warner Robins, 4" the supreme court elaborated
a new "proximate cause" approach for determining municipal liability to

135. Id. at 638, 452 S.E.2d at 491. The court expressly overruled Vickers v. City of
Fitzgerald, 216 Ga. 476, 117 S.E.2d 316 (1960) and City of Gainesville v. Moss, 108 Ga.
App. 713, 134 S.E.2d 547 (1963). 264 Ga. at 638, 452 S.E.2d at 491.
136. 264 Ga. at 636, 452 S.E.2d at 490.
137. Id. "So long as ante litem notice is given to a municipal corporation within six
months of the happening of any continuing trespass 'event,' an action for trespass may
thereafter be brought within four years of the happening of that 'event.'" Id. at 636-37, 452
S.E.2d at 490.
138. Id. at 637, 452 S.E.2d at 491. The court then summarized the impact of its ruling
upon this case:
Consequently, because appellee failed to give any written ante litem notice prior
to the filing of the complaint and thus entirely failed to fulfil the condition
precedent to maintaining this suit as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5, summary
judgment in favor of the City was proper as to appellee's claim for damages
resulting from any continuing trespass "event" which occurred more than six
months prior to the filing of the complaint. Any claim that appellee may have for
damages resulting from a continuing trespass "event" which occurred within six
months of the filing of the complaint would be subject to a plea in abatement,
rather than a motion seeking substantive adjudication.
264 Ga. at 638, 452 S.E.2d at 491.
139. 213 Ga. App. 455, 444 S.E.2d 809 (1994).
140. Id. at 458, 444 S.E.2d at 812. The plaintiffs complained of damage to their
property by a contractor employed by the municipality; the court agreed with plaintiffs that
a trespass had indeed occurred. Id.
141. Id. The court termed punitive damages "impermissible as a matter of law." Id.
142. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of the municipality's motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages, Id.
143. 264 Ga. 385, 444 S.E.2d 761 (1994).
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motorists imperiled by suspects fleeing a police officer. 1 " Deeming the
issue to call for a "policy decision" on "duty,"145 the court viewed
statutory law to subject pursuing officers to a "due regard for the safety

of all persons."146 So armed, the court adopted the following rule:
"'The decision to initiate or continue pursuit may be negligent when the
heightened risk of injury to third parties is unreasonable in relation to
the interest in apprehending suspects.'"14 7 Proceeding to employ that
rule, the court noted evidence that the suspect had slowly run a stop
sign in a residential area and, upon the officer's immediate pursuit, had
accelerated up to twice the posted speed limit.1" Under those circumstances,149 the
court held, a summary judgment for the city was
0
erroneous.15
Yet another tort basic confronted the court of appeals in Girone v. City
of Winder.'5 ' There, plaintiff alleged several raw sewerage spills onto
her property from the city's negligently maintained sewer system."5 2
Upon the last spill, plaintiff allowed the sludge to flow from her

144. Id. at 389, 444 S.E.2d at 765. Plaintiff sued for the death of his wife struck at an
intersection by a driver fleeing from a pursuing police officer. Id. at 385, 444 S.E.2d at

763.
145. Id. at 386,444 S.E.2d at 763 (quoting McAuley v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3,303 S.E.2d 258
(1983)).
146. Id. at 387, 444 S.E.2d at 764 (citing O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 (1994 & Supp. 1995)).
"Thus, the officer's avoidance of civil liability cannot derive from the mere intervening
flight of the criminal suspect, but is solely dependent upon the officer's own adherence to
his duty to drive with the requisite due regard for the safety of others." Id. at 388, 444
S.E.2d at 764.
147. Id. at 389, 444 S.E.2d at 765. The court plucked this rule from a Texas case,
Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1992), and rejected the Georgia Court of
Appeals' formulation below (whether the pursuit posed a higher-than-ordinary threat to
public safety) as "problematic." 264 Ga. at 389, 444 S.E.2d at 765. See Mixon v. City of
Warner Robins, 209 Ga. App. 414, 434 S.E.2d 71 (1993).
148. 264 Ga. at 390, 444 S.E.2d at 766.
149. Id. at 391, 444 S.E.2d at 766.
On this evidence, a jury would be authorized to find that [the officer] had failed
to balance the risk to the safety of other drivers when he persisted in his efforts
to arrest [the suspect] for a minor traffic offense even after [the suspect] had
escalated his flight into a high-speed chase in a residential area and that [the
officer] had, therefore, failed to act in accordance with his duty under O.C.G.A.
§ 40-6-6(d) to pursue [the suspect] with due regard to the safety of other drivers.
264 Ga. at 391, 444 S.E.2d at 766.
150. 264 Ga. at 391, 444 S.E.2d at 766. "It follows that the lack of'proximate cause'
in the instant case is not 'plain and undisputed' and that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of [the officer] and the City on that
basis." Id.
151. 215 Ga. App. 822, 452 S.E.2d 794 (1994), cert. granted.
152. Id. at 822, 452 S.E.2d at 795. Plaintiff alleged continuous spills over a period of
some two years, repeated notice to the municipality, and a steadfast failure to repair. Id.
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basement onto a concrete patio where, while directing cleanup operations, she slipped and suffered injury 1
Reversing summary judgment in favor of the municipality, a majority of the court emphasized the
city's wrongful trespass upon plaintiff's property" and minimized
plaintiff's contribution to her injury.15 "Whether plaintiff exercised
due care for her own safety in trying to perform defendant's function
herself due to its recalcitrance, is for the jury"'56 Although plaintiff
clearly knew of the hazard, the court concluded, her actions in confronting it were not, under the circumstances, unreasonable as a matter of
57
law.1
Finally, City of Buford v. Ward'5 8 litigated the personal liability of
municipal officials under the following historic statute: "Members of the
council and other officers of a municipal corporation shall be personally
liable to one who sustains special damages as the result of any official
act of such officers if done oppressively, maliciously, corruptly, or
without authority of law."'59 The case encompassed an action against
the city manager and his assistant for their refusal to issue a timely
certificate of occupancy for plaintiff's garden center."s° Noting defendants' refusal as having turned upon their insistence that plaintiff

153. Id. Plaintiff alleged that she called a cleaning crew and, upon its arrival, she led
them to the basement via the sewage-covered patio, rather than approaching through the
house in the absence of her husband. Id. at 823, 452 S.E.2d at 795.
154. Id., 452 S.E.2d at 796. "The policy behind the 'superior knowledge' standard (i.e.,
to protect proprietors from liability in cases where invitees fail to exercise ordinary care
for their own safety) is not achieved in cases where a trespasser creates a dangerous
condition on the property of another." Id. at 824, 452 S.E.2d at 797.
155. Id. at 825, 452 S.E.2d at 797. "Although she knew of the hazard, her choice in
confronting it rather than what she perceived as the greater hazard attendant to admitting
strangers into her home when she was alone is not unreasonable as a matter of law." Id.
156. Id. at 824, 452 S.E.2d at 797.
157. Id. at 825, 452 S.E.2d at 797. Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Andrews
dissented: "This is a clear case where the plaintiff is barred from recovery because she
knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of injury by choosing to walk across the
slippery patio." Id. at 828, 452 S.E.2d at 799 (Birdsong, P.J., dissenting).
158. 212 Ga. App. 752, 443 S.E.2d 279 (1994).
159. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-4 (1993). For the origin, history, and judicial evolution of this
statute, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for Their
Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979). See also, for treatment of Georgia's peculiar
nonstatutory statute, R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Statutes ofNonstatutory Origin, 14 GA. L. REV.
239 (1980). For a broader coverage of individual liability in local government law, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in GeorgiaLocal Government Law: The Haunting
Hiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988) and Local Government Tort Liability:
The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405, 423 (1993).
160. 212 Ga, App. at 753,443 S.E.2d at 281. Plaintiff finally opened his business, went
bankrupt, and then brought the present case. Id., 443 S.E.2d at 282.
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install a longer acceleration-deceleration lane, ' the court also located
the ordinance under which defendants acted. 162 That ordinance was
163
devoid of "even a listing of guidelines or factors to be considered,"
the court asserted, and confirmed defendants' policy of "unfettered
discretion.1

64

"[Aictions taken pursuant to this policy," reasoned the

court, "were taken without authority of law;"6 5 accordingly, "plaintiff
established the necessary elements of a cause of action." 6
H.

Zoning
The local government's zoning exercise teeters precariously between
public good and individual harm, a delineation drawn and even redrawn
by the judiciary.167 Typically illustrative of the process, ParkingAss'n
of Georgia v. City of Atlanta"' presented a challenge by parking lot
owners to municipal efforts at zoning their lots. 9 Specifically, the
ordinance in issue required lots with thirty or more spaces to maintain
barrier curbs and landscaping areas equal to at least ten percent of
paved area, ground cover, and at least one tree for every eight spaces.
The ordinance did, however, cap the required reduction of parking spaces

161. Id., 443 S.E.2d at 281. Plaintiff alleged that he constructed such a lane even
longer than the State Department of Transportation required, but that defendants
continued to insist upon more. Id. at 755, 443 S.E.2d at 282.
162. Id. at 754, 443 S.E.2d at 282. "At best, the authority for this policy was a zoning
law which purported to incorporate unspecified DOT regulations which discussed generally
the use of deceleration/acceleration lanes to facilitate traffic flow." Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. "Because the policy implemented by [defendants] gave them unfettered
discretion and was not based on an ordinance setting forth guidelines or factors for
consideration with sufficient specificity to apprise citizens of what to expect, actions taken
pursuant to this policy were taken without authority of law." Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 755, 443 S.E.2d at 283. The court observed that sovereign immunity had
been indisputably removed in the case due to the presence of liability insurance. Id. at
756, 443 S.E.2d at 283. The court affirmed the trial judge's denial of defendants' motion
for j.n.o.v. Id.
As for an action against the official in his official capacity, see McLemore v. City Council
of Augusta, 212 Ga. App. 862, 443 S.E.2d 505 (1994), where the court reasoned that a
police officer would enjoy immunity if his allegedly negligent act was discretionary rather
than ministerial. There, the court remanded as a jury issue the question whether, at the
time the officer collided with plaintiff, he was acting in a discretionary capacity by
continuing to respond to an emergency. Id. at 865, 443 S.E.2d at 508.
167. For perspective, and treatment of a rather special problem in local government
zoning, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Exposure to Local Government Zoning,
25 GA. ST. B.J. 180 (1989).
168. 264 Ga. 764, 450 S.E.2d 200 (1994).
169. Id. at 764, 450 S.E.2d at 202. The ordinance applied in certain downtown and
midtown zoning districts. Id., 450 S.E.2d at 201.
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at three percent.170 A bare majority of the supreme court 171 approached the face-off by noting that the ordinance did not physically
"take" property, but "merely regulated" its use. 1 72 In that context, the
17
"balancing test" weighs public benefit against individual detriment. 1
Under that test, the property owner must produce "clear and convincing"
evidence that "the zoning presents a significant detriment to the
landowner and is insubstantially related to the public health, safety,
morality and welfare."' 74 Because a maximum loss of three percent of
plaintiffs' parking spaces did not constitute "significant detriment," 75
and because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate "insubstantial relation" to
valid goals, 76 the court declared the ordinance "constitutional and
valid." 7 7
A vigorous dissenting opinion charged the majority with applying the
wrong "test."178 Instead of "significant detriment," the dissent proposed that this case required a "benefit-extraction" test. 7 ' "Extractions for the public benefit are generally upheld if... two requirements
are met: First, that the extraction is closely related to a particular
problem generated by the owner's use of his land,... and second, that
the extraction represents the property owner's proportion of the
particular problem."'
Conceding that Georgia has not previously

170. Id., 450 S.E.2d at 202. All costs of compliance were borne by the landowners. Id.
171. Id. at 767, 450 S.E.2d at 203, Justice Thompson authored the opinion for himself
and three other justices. Id.
172. Id. at 764, 450 S.E.2d at 202. "Thus, the ordinance does not constitute a per se
taking entitling plaintiffs to compensation." Id.
173. Id. at 765, 450 S.E.2d at 202.
174. Id. The ordinance is presumptively valid, and the plaintiffs bear the burden of
rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
175. Id. "[A] zoning ordinance does not exceed the police power simply because it
restricts the use of property, diminishes the value of property, or imposes costs in
connection with the property." Id.
176, Id. Stated goals included the regulation of aesthetics, crime, water run-off,
temperature, and other environmental concerns. Id.
177, Id. at 766, 450 S.E.2d at 203. The court concluded that plaintiffs had failed "to
meet either prong of this state's balancing test." Id. The court also rejected plaintiffs'
argument of equal protection: the larger lots (30 or more spaces) had far greater impact
upon the ordinance's stated goals. Id.
178. Id. at 767, 450 S.E.2d at 203 (Sears, J., dissenting). Justice Sears authored the
dissent for herself and two other justices. Id. at 769, 450 S.E.2d at 204.
179. Id. at 767, 450 S.E.2d at 204. The dissent noted that some states had established
an exception to the "significant detriment" test in cases where, as here, "a local government
has sought to extract a benefit for the public from only a portion of a whole parcel of
property." Id., 450 S.E.2d at 203.
180. Id. at 768, 450 S.E.2d at 204. Other considerations to be taken into account
included the fact that the extraction was not made at the property's development stage so
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employed the benefit-extraction test, the dissent proposed that the case
be remanded for resolution under that analysis.181
I. Authorities
In Parker v. Hospital Authority of Bainbridge & Decatur County,'82
a medical malpractice action against a hospital authority, a nurse, and
treating doctors, the court of appeals held as follows: "[Olne's relationship to a board member of an entity that is a party to an action does not,
as a matter of law, disqualify him to serve as a juror in the case."" s
Additionally, the court held the nurse a "borrowed servant" of the doctor,
and the doctor an "independent contractor.""s
Accordingly, the
hospital authority bore responsibility for the acts of neither.
II.

COUNTIES

A.

Power
Increasingly, the county "power" issue, here surveyed each year,
appears to be undergoing transition. Increasingly, the contests
encompass power tug-of-wars within the county government itself. The
supreme court refereed two such contests this year.
Brophy v. McCranie'" presented a stand-off between the county
governing authority and the hospital authority's board of trustees."
The controlling issue went to board vacancy appointments: Were they
governed by a resolution of the governing authority or by resolution of
the trustees? In resolving that issue, the court interpreted an ambigu-

as to afford the owner an option, and the nature of the governmental interest at stake (e.g.,
aesthetics rather than public safety). Id.The dissent expressly did not decide which party
had the burden of proof under the benefit-extraction test. Id. at 768 n.5, 450 S.E.2d at 204
n.5.
181. Id. at 768, 450 S.E.2d at 204.
182. 214 Ga. App. 113, 446 S.E.2d 766 (1994).
183. Id. at 113, 446 S.E.2d at 767. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in refusing
to exclude for cause a potential juror who was related to a member of the hospital
authority board. Id.
184. Id. at 114, 446 S.E.2d at 768. The fact that the doctor was on call because of his
hospital staff privileges did not change his status of independent contractor. Id.
185. 264 Ga. 187, 442 S.E.2d 230 (1994).
186. Id. at 187, 442 S.E.2d at 230. The governing authority sought, via an action in
quo warranto, to have seven of the nine trustees divested of their offices as having been
invalidly appointed under a resolution of the trustees. Id. For perspective on the historic
remedy of quo warranto in the context of Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE WRIT OF Quo WARRANTO IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1987).
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ous provision of the Hospital Authorities
1

7

to vest method-of-

appointment power in the trustees. 88
The issue in In re DeKalb County Courthouse Fire Sprinkler Sys-

tem"ss pitted the governing authority against a judge of the superior

court. The authority challenged the judge's issuance of a "certificate of
need" requiring the installation of fire sprinklers in the courthouse.ro
"The essential question," asserted the court, "is whether the issuance of
the certificate of need was in furtherance of a specifically judicial
function."19' On grounds that "there is nothing inherently judicial
about concerns for fire safety,"192 the court held the matter "within the
purview of the county governing authority, which is charged with the
maintenance and upkeep of the county's public buildings."" 3

187. O.C.GA. § 31-7-72(c) (1991 & Supp. 1995). According to the court, this provision
was a rearrangement and consolidation of two paragraphs of the original statute which had
clearly provided that vacancy appointment methods were those mandated by resolution of
the board of trustees. 264 Ga. at 189, 442 S.E.2d at 231.
188. 264 Ga. at 189, 442 S.E.2d at 232. The court denominated the county governing
authority's resolution "invalid as an improper exercise of home rule," and held the seven
trustees to have been validly appointed. Id. at 190, 442 S.E.2d at 232.
189. 265 Ga. 96, 454 S.E.2d 126 (1995).
190. Id. at 96, 454 S.E.2d at 126. "The Certificate of Need process contemplated by
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24 is the procedural rule pursuant to which the power of the court is
exercised." 265 Ga. at 96, 454 S.E.2d at 127.
191. 265 Ga. at 97, 454 S.E.2d at 127. The court said that "the inherent [judiciall
power is not a sword but a shield." Id.
192. Id. at 97-98, 454 S.E.2d at 127. It was clear, the court reasoned, "that the issuing
court's concern with fire safety is the same concern properly held by any governmental
agency as a tenant of a government building." Id. at 97, 454 S.E.2d at 127.
193. Id. at 98, 454 S.E.2d at 127. Affirmingjudgment in favor of the county governing
authority, the court suggested that the judge "could, as could any other citizen, seek a writ
of mandamus requiring the governing authorities to obey the law." Id.
Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Hunstein, dissented on grounds that the judge had
acted within his inherent judicial power in issuing the Certificate of Need. Id. at 99, 454
S.E.2d at 128 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
In a more traditional power guise, county power to regulate, S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond
County, 215 Ga. App. 73, 449 S.E.2d 868 (1994), involved county revocation of the liquor
license of an establishment providing nude dancing. The court of appeals invalidated the
revocation, holding the controlling ordinance's exception of "mainstream" performance
premises to be solely dependent upon whether the establishment derived less than 20% of
its gross annual income from alcohol sales. "To construe the applicability of the exception
as first requiring testing for that which is 'mainstream' but otherwise undefined, in our
view, would be to adopt a construction which would be constitutionally impermissible for
vagueness and overbreadth." Id. at 75, 449 S.E.2d at 870.
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Officers and Employees
Candidates for membership on the county governing authority may
encounter an assortment of requirements. Griffin v. Glynn County"
featured a local statute requiring such candidates "to run for election
from the district in which their legal residence lies."195 Upholding the
it to conflict with neither
validity of that statute, the supreme court held
9 nor with general statutes. 197
constitution'
the
A general statute imposed the requirement reviewed in State Ethics
Commissioner v. Moore,19 a requirement that "common source"
campaign contributions be revealed in financial disclosure reports. 199
There, the common-source origins of certain contributions were known
to the candidate but not to her campaign treasurer who filed the
report. 00 Under these circumstances, a majority of the court of
appeals held, no penalty could be assessed against the candidate.0 1
Observing that the statute directed its disclosure mandate to "the
candidate or the chairperson or treasurer of such candidate's campaign
committee,"" 2 the court found no statutory authority "to impose a
of her campaign treasurer in
penalty on [the candidate] for
20 3 the conduct
B.

filing an inaccurate report."

194. 264 Ga. 823, 452 S.E.2d 109 (1995).
195. 1982 Ga. Laws 4570.
196. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, para. 8 (1976).
197. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1 (1990 & Supp. 1995). The court affirmed the trial
judge's grant of summary judgment for defendant candidates. 264 Ga. at 823, 452 S.E.2d
at 110.
198. 214 Ga. App. 236, 447 S.E.2d 687 (1994).
199. O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30(d): "Where separate contributions of less than $101.00 are
knowingly received from a common source, such contributions shall be aggregated for
reporting purposes." O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30(d) (1993 & Supp. 1995).
200. 214 Ga. App. at 237, 447 S.E.2d at 688. "There was no evidence that [the
candidate] prepared or reviewed the reports, and there was no evidence that the campaign
treasurer had any knowledge regarding the common source contributions." Id., 447 S.E.2d
at 689.
201. Id.at 238, 447 S.E.2d at 689. The court employed a "strict construction"
interpretation to the statute, noting that it was in derogation of the common law and that
forfeitures and penalties are not favored. Id. at 237-38, 447 S.E.2d at 689.
202. O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34 (1993 & Supp. 1995). This statute must be read "in pari
materia" with the report requirement itself, said the court. 214 Ga. App. at 237, 447
S.E.2d at 688. "Since the treasurer was authorized to file and sign the reports, and based
his disclosure of common source contributions on his own personal knowledge, only he
could be the 'violator' for the purpose of imposition of penalties under O.C.G.A. § 21-56(bX14)." 214 Ga. App. at 238, 447 S.E.2d at 689.
203. 214 Ga. App. at 238, 447 S.E.2d at 689. "Ifimputed knowledge is to be made the
basis of a fine or penalty, the intent of the legislature must be made abundantly clear."
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Another subject of scrutiny is the officer's working in more than one
capacity for the county. For instance, Black v. Catoosa County School
District2. yielded a decision by the court of appeals that a county
deputy sheriff could not simultaneously serve as a member of the school
board. Anchoring the prohibition in both general' 5 and local legislation, 0 ' the court held that both a school board member and a sheriff
were commissioned county officers. 7 "[Ilt is clear," the court asserted,
"that one cannot be a commissioned officer (school board member) and
be a deputy for any other commissioned officer (sheriff) at the same
time."2 8
The supreme court considered a different type of capacity conflict in
Chapel v. State,2 an action to disqualify an attorney from representing a criminal defendant because the attorney represented the county in
other (civil) matters.1 0 On the grounds that the attorney intended to
use information obtained during his civil work for the county to assist
in his representation of the criminal defendant, the court affirmed the
attorney's disqualification.211 The court reasoned that both a conflict

Id. at 239, 447 S.E.2d at 690.
A four-judge dissent insisted that a candidate could not dodge requirements of the
reporting statute by delegating reporting responsibility to a treasurer who does not
recognize contributions which the candidate knows must be reported. Id. at 240, 447
S.E.2d at 690 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting). The statute, the dissenters maintained, places
ultimate responsibility upon the candidate. Id.
204. 213 Ga. App. 534, 445 S.E.2d 340 (1994).
205. O.C.G.A. § 45-2-2 (1990). The court described this statute as prohibiting"a person
from holding or being commissioned to hold more than one county office at one time except
by special enactment of the General Assembly." 213 Ga. App. at 535, 447 S.E.2d at 340.
206. 1993 Ga. Laws 4528.
207. 213 Ga. App. at 535, 445 S.E.2d at 341, The court cited GA. CONST.art. IX, § 1,
para. 3.
208. 213 Ga. App. at 535, 445 S.E.2d at 341, The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
grant of an injunction. Id.
209. 264 Ga. 267, 443 S.E.2d 271 (1994).
210. Id. at 267, 443 S.E.2d at 272. The accused criminal defendant was a former
county police officer. Id., 443 S.E.2d at 271. The action for disqualification was brought
by both the district attorney and the county commissioners. Id., 443 S.E.2d at 272.
211. Id.at 269, 443 S.E.2d at 273. The court reasoned that
[the attorney's] use of the knowledge and information in his possession regarding
potential state witnesses in [the] criminal prosecution to discredit those witnesses
would be contrary to the interests of the state and, therefore, the county, thus
creating a conflict between the interests of [the criminal defendant] and the
interests of the county.
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of interests and an appearance of impropriety rendered the attorney's
criminal representation impermissible. 12
Resignations and reassignments give full account of themselves in the
law of county officials. As for the former, Henry County Board of
Registrars v. Farmer213 sought out the correct recipient for a letter of
resignation from a member of the county board of registrars.2" 4
Holding statutory law to mandate acceptance by the judge of superior
court,2 15 the court of appeals declared ineffective

a resignation

submitted to the chief registrar."'
Hamilton v. Telfair County School District2 17 focused upon a school
principal's reassignment 21 -- specifically upon whether the transfer
constituted a demotion thus entitling plaintiff to a hearing.219 Holding
demotion to require "adverse effect on one's salary, responsibility, and
prestige,"22 the supreme court scored plaintiff's failure to establish a
reduction in pay.22' "Accordingly, [plaintiffi cannot demonstrate that

212. Id. at 270, 443 S.E.2d at 274. Additionally, the court noted that there would be
a potential for a post-trial claim of ineffectiveness, "based on the possibility that [the
attorney's] loyalty to or efforts on behalf of [the criminal defendant] could be threatened
by his responsibilities to the county." Id.
213. 213 Ga. App. 522, 444 S.E.2d 877 (1994).
214. Id. at 522, 444 S.E.2d at 877. Plaintiff sought back pay, contending that her
resignation to the chief registrar which was sent to, but not accepted by, the superior court
judge was ineffective. Id.
215. Id. at 523, 444 S.E.2d at 878. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 21-2-211 (1993 & Supp.
1995)). The court relied upon O.C.G.A. § 21-2-211. The court said that "[elven though
there was evidence that [the chief registrar] had forwarded the letter... to the chiefjudge,
there was no evidence that the letter was either received or accepted." 213 Ga. App. at
523, 444 S.E.2d at 878.
216. 213 Ga. App. at 523, 444 S.E.2d at 878. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
award of back pay to the plaintiff. Id.
217. 265 Ga. 304, 455 S.E.2d 23 (1995).
218, Id. at 304, 455 S.E.2d at 23. Plaintiff had been transferred from her position of
assistant principal at the county high school to the position of principal at the county
alternative training center, Id.
219. Id. Plaintiff sued under Georgia's Fair Dismissal Law, requesting a hearing under
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160. 265 Ga. at 305, 455 S.E.2d at 24 (Benham, P.J., dissenting). See
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
220. 265 Ga. at 304, 455 S.E.2d at 23. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. § 20-2943(aX2)(C) (1992), and Rockdale County School Dist. v. Weil, 245 Ga. 730,266,S.E.2d 919
(1980). 265 Ga. at 304, 455 S.E.2d at 23.
221. 265 Ga. at 304, 455 S.E.2d at 23. The court noted the record to support findings
that had plaintiff remained in her former position, she would have received total
compensation of $44,273.44, and that in her new position she would receive total
compensation of $45,671.00. Id.
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her transfer constitutes a demotion,"22 the court reasoned, affirming
the trial judge's denial of her petition for a hearing.223
The county's responsibility for workers' compensation benefits
constituted the concern of North v.Floyd County Board of Education.224 That concern focused upon an applicant for the position of
substitute school bus driver injured while undergoing a two-week
training period. During that period, plaintiff was neither compensated
nor assured of employment.2 2 In these circumstances, and operating
under the "any evidence rule,"22 a majority of the court of appeals
affirmed a decision that the plaintiff was not a county "employee" at the
time of her injury.. 7
C. Finances
The survey period canvassed an assortment of litigated county
financial facets. Abe Engineering, Inc. v. Fulton County Board of
Education' encompassed a scenario in which the board accepted a
statutorily sufficient payment bond from its contractor and made final
payment to the contractor upon verification of work completion. 229

222. Id.
223. Id. Presiding Justice Benham, joined by Justice Hunstein, dissented, primarily
taking issue with the trial court's method of determining what plaintiff's pay would have
been had she remained in her former position: "The trial court opined that, had appellant
remained in her former position, she would not have received the optional $2400 [county]
supplement and would have received an 11-month contract instead of a 12-month contract."
Id. at 307, 455 S.E.2d at 25 (Benham, P.J., dissenting). The dissenters argued that
exclusion of the local supplemental pay from the calculation was error. Id.
224. 212 Ga. App. 593, 442 S.E.2d 809 (1994).
225. Id. at 593, 442 S.E.2d at 810. Plaintiff was injured after accompanying a bus
driver on a route when she fell while walking from the bus to her car. Id. The
administrative law judge had decided against plaintiff primarily because she had not been
assured of employment even upon successful completion of the training program and
because she had received no compensation during the training period. Id.
226. Id. at 595, 442 S.E.2d at 811. "Those findings are supported by evidence in this
record, and we are, therefore, bound to accept them under the 'any evidence' standard of
review." Id.
227. Id. The court reasoned that the potential benefit to the county from having
another driver in the pool of substitute drih e-s "is not significant enough to demand a
finding of an implied contract of employment in this case." Id. at 594, 442 S.E.2d at 811.
A four-judge dissenting opinion maintained that the "any evidence" rule did not apply
when the administrative findings rest upon an erroneous legal theory, that the chief test
is "control," and that this facet was not considered below. Id.at 595-96, 442 S.E.2d at 81112 (Blackburn, J., dissenting). The dissenters argued that the case should be remanded
for the compensation board's consideration of this facet. Id.at 596, 442 S.E.2d at 812.
228. 214 Ga. App. 514, 448 S.E.2d 221 (1994).
229. Id. at 514, 448 S.E.2d at 222. The court observed that "there is no question that
the payment bond in issue met the statutory requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36-82-102 and was
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Following that final payment, the subcontractor on the project obtained
an arbitration award against the contractor and sought to hold the board
responsible for that award.23 The court of appeals held that the
board's actions satisfied its statutory responsibilities"' and that it
"was not required.., to obtain an additional payment bond from [the
contractor] pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding on [the
subcontractor's] payment dispute with [the contractor]." 32
Moving from payment bonds to sales taxes, C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Collins233 featured a contractor's claim for refunds of local
option sales taxes paid while performing state highway construction
projects. 3 4 Holding the statutory tax exemption unequivocal and
clear,235 the court declared that "the phrase 'any tax' includes the local
option, MARTA, and special county sales taxes which were assessed
with its contracts
against [plaintiff] on work performed in connection
23
with [the Georgia Department of Transportation.]"

approved by and filed with the appropriate official." 214 Ga. App. at 515, 448 S.E.2d at
223.
230. 214 Ga. App. at 514,448 S.E.2d at 222. The award arose out of a dispute between
the contractor and subcontractor over work performed under the subcontract agreement.
Id.
231. Id. at 515, 448 S.E.2d at 223. Otherwise, the court noted, "'A county is not liable
to suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute.' O.C.G.A. § 36-1-4." 214 Ga. App.
at 515, 448 S.E.2d at 223.
232. 214 Ga. App. at 515, 448 S.E.2d at 223. Thus, the court affirmed summary
judgment for the county board of education. Id. at 516. 448 S.E.2d at 223.
233. 214 Ga. App. 532, 448 S.E.2d 234 (1994).
234. Id. at 532, 448 S.E.2d at 234. These taxes were paid over a three-year period and
collected by the State Revenue Commissioner. Id.
235. Id. at 533, 448 S.E.2d at 235. See O.C.G.A. § 50-17-29(e) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
Said the court: "It plainly prohibits the imposition of 'any tax, assessment, levy, license
fee, or other fee' upon contractors 'as a ... result of the performance of a contract, work,
or services in connection with any project being constructed (etc) for, or on behalf of, the
state or any of its agencies

...

'" 214 Ga. App. at 533, 448 S.E.2d at 235.

236. 214 Ga. App. at 534,448 S.E.2d at 235. In holding the plaintiff contractor entitled
to the refund, the court reversed the lower court and rejected an opinion by the Attorney
General drawing a distinction between taxes on person and property in comparison to taxes
on transactions. Id. at 533, 448 S.E.2d at 235.
Some three weeks after the decision in C.W. Matthews, the court decided Gainesville
Asphalt, Inc. v. Hall County, 214 Ga. App. 679, 448 S.E.2d 721 (1994). There, the court
refused to extend the statutory exemption of O.C.G.A. § 50-17-29(e) to county ad valorem
taxes on plaintiffs inventory and equipment permanently located in the county, even
though plaintiff alleged that it had sold 74% of the asphalt it produced during the taxable
year to the Georgia Department of Transportation. 214 Ga. App. at 679,448 S.E.2d at 721.
Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that [the county] did not tax
[plaintiffs] inventory and equipment solely as a condition to or result of the
performance of work on behalf of the state, the trial court properly granted
summary judgment to the county and denied summary judgment to [plaintiff] on
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The supreme court entered the financial fray in Clayton County
Airport Authority v. State,23 7 a proceeding to validate the authority's
revenue bonds for financing acquisition of a county airport.23 Under
the challenged agreement, the county would convey the airport to the
authority, use the expanded airport facility, and pay "amounts sufficient
to enable the Authority to pay the principal and interest on" the revenue
bonds.2 39 In rejecting intervenors' protests to the arrangement as an
unconstitutional county "debt,"2 40
a unanimous court reviewed
relevant authority.24 The constitution's "intergovernmental contracts
clause" authorized the agreement, the court reasoned, because both the
authority and the county possessed statutory power to provide airport
facilities.242 The court placed like reliance upon the clause to sustain
the county's agreement to exercise its power of taxation in paying for the
use of the airport facility.2" Although the county could not levy taxes
to pay off the revenue bonds, it "could 'enter into contracts with the
Authority and... pledge its full faith and credit and levy taxes to meet
its contractual obligations pursuant to the law of contracts."' 2"

its claim for a refund based on work it did for the DOT.
Id. at 681, 448 S.E.2d at 722.
237. 265 Ga. 24, 453 S.E.2d 8 (1995).
238. Id. at 24, 453 S.E.2d at 9. The validation proceeding was brought under O.C.G.A.
§ 36-82-75. Id.See O.C.G.A. § 36-82-75 (1993).
239. 265 Ga. at 24, 453 S.E.2d at 9.
240. Id. at 25, 453 S.E.2d at 10. The GEORGIA CONSTITUTION, art. IX, § 3, para. 1,
prohibits local governments from incurring new indebtedness without the assent of a
majority of the qualified voters. 265 Ga. at 24, 453 S.E.2d at 9. The trial court had voided
the agreement in issue as violating this prohibition. Id.
241. 265 Ga. at 24, 453 S.E.2d at 9. "Whether the contractual consideration is an
unconstitutional 'new debt' incurred by the County or the Authority's lawful 'revenue
pledged to the payment of its bonds is dependent upon whether the contract between the
County and the Authority is a valid intergovernmental contract authorized by Art. IX, § 3,
para. 1, of our constitution." 265 Ga. at 24, 453 S.E.2d at 9.
242. 265 Ga. at 25, 453 S.E.2d at 10. The court said that "the Authority is granted
broad [power] to undertake to provide an airport facility for the County. Ga. L. 1994, pp.
4305,4311 et seq." and that"pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-220(14), the County is authorized
specifically to expend tax revenues to provide for an airport facility." 265 Ga. at 25, 453
S.E.2d at 10. Given those powers, the court held, "the contractual consideration represents
the Authority's lawful 'revenue pledged to the payment of its bonds rather than an
unconstitutional 'new debt' incurred by the County." Id.
243. 265 Ga. at 26, 453 S.E.2d at 10. The revenue bond statutes expressly prohibit the
holders of revenue bonds from compelling the exercise of the tax power of the governmental
body to pay the bonds or the interest. O.C.G.A. § 36-82-66 (1993).
244. 265 Ga. at 26, 453 S.E.2d at 10 (quoting Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 288
Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976)). It was immaterial, the court additionally held, that the
county would not pay its consideration for the use of the airport to the authority but would
rather pay directly to the custodian of the authority's sinking fund established for retire-
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D. Openness
Counties faced "openness" challenges in respect both to their records
and their meetings during the survey period."4 Jersawitz v. Hicks24
featured an action to mandamus a means by which real estate records,
available to the public on a computer tape, "could be directly accessed
via a telephone modem on a personal computer."" 7 Affirming denial
of the petition, the supreme court conceded that real estate deeds are
public records under the Open Records Act,2 4' but noted a recent
amendment's provision for charges for "computer disks or tapes." 9
Thus, the Act did not require access by personal computer modem, and
was satisfied by the county's computer tape program. 260
Challengers received slightly better treatment from a closely divided

court of appeals in Crosland v. Butts County Board of Zoning Ap-

peals. s1 There, complainants charged the county board's violation of
the Open Meetings Act252 by holding nonpublic meetings prior to its
public hearings on a permit for a solid waste landfill.53 On grounds
that the evidence demonstrated "a conflict as to what action was or was
not taken at the non-public meetings, 2a 4 the court reversed the trial
judge's summary judgment against the plaintiffs. 55 In the court's
view, "the conflicting evidence suggests the petition may have been

ment of the bonds. Id.
245. For background and an early review of both topics, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The
Omen of "Openness"in Local Government Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97 (1978).
...
246. 264 Ga. 553, 448 S.E.2d 352 (1994).

247. Id. at 554, 448 S.E.2d at 352. The action was directed against the clerk of the
county superior court. Id. at 553-54, 448 S.E.2d at 352.
248. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -135 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
249. 1992 Ga. Laws 1061; O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71(f) (1994).
250. 264 Ga. at 554, 448 S.E.2d at 353. The court noted that "the prevalence of
computers in homes, offices, and schools may make on-line access to computerized public
records desirable," but reasoned that "requiring that means of access must be addressed
by the General Assembly." Id. For analysis of the frequency with which mandamus is
unsuccessful in local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS
IN GEORGIA LoCAL GovERNmENT LAw (1989).

251. 214 Ga. App. 295, 448 S.E.2d 454 (1994).
252. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1994).
253. 214 Ga. App. at 296, 448 S.E.2d at 455. Defendants admitted that nonpublic
meetings were held but denied that official actions were taken in violation of the Open
Meetings Act. Id.
254. Id. at 297, 448 S.E.2d at 455. The. court contrasted the testimony of one of the
members of the zoning appeals board that the substantive merits of the request were not
discussed and that no decisions were made, against the testimony of the county attorney
that decisions on the granting of the petition were reached. Id. at 296, 448 S.E.2d at 455.
255. Id. at 297, 448 S.E.2d at 455.
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'acted on' by the 'officials' charged with taking the 'official action' at
these non-public meetings."2 6
E.

Roads
A major concern and responsibility of county government, public roads
are also a continuing source of litigation. The period's illustration of the
point came in Smith v. Board of Commissioners of Athens-Clarke
County. 57 There, property owners adjacent to an unpaved county road
sought to enjoin the governing authority's abandonment of the road and
appealed the trial judge's denial of relief.258 In affirming that action,
the supreme court took note of statutory authority for county abandonment if the road "has ceased to be used by the public to the extent that
no substantial public purpose is served by it."25 ' Reviewing evidence
that public nonuse was for reasons other than the road's disrepair,6 °
the court denied the abandonment to constitute an abuse of the
governing authority's discretion.26'
F

Liability
In Gilbert v. Richardson,2 the Georgia Supreme Court undertook
a major analysis of current county tort responsibility."' The case
arose out of plaintiff's collision with a deputy sheriff responding to an
emergency; plaintiff sued both the deputy and the sheriff.264 Setting

256. Id. A four-judge dissent maintained that if the motion to grant the permit was
not passed until the public meeting, there was no violation of the Open Meetings Act. Id.
at 299, 448 S.E.2d at 457 (Smith, J., dissenting). "The Act does provide for a remedy for
a violation such as that alleged here: an injunction could have issued prohibiting further
closed meetings ....

Penalties may be imposed ....

The Act simply does not provide for

invalidating the permit unless the 'official action' was taken at a closed meeting." Id.
257. 264 Ga. 316, 444 S.E.2d 775 (1994).
258. Id. at 316, 444 S.E.2d at 775. County abandonment had come in response to the
owners' obtaining a mandamus for the road's repair. Id.
259. O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1995). The only limitation upon this power
arises when the public's ceasing to use the road is caused by the county's failure to
maintain it. Cherokee County v. McBride, 262 Ga. 460, 421 S.E.2d 530 (1992).
260. 264 Ga. at 317, 444 S.E.2d at 776. The trial court had found public nonuse to
arise from the facts that the bridge on the road was submerged when it rained and that
alternative paved routes were available. Id.
261. Id.
262. 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
263. For background, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Tort Liability:
The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1986) and Local Government Tort
Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
264. 264 Ga. at 745, 452 S.E.2d at 478. The trial court granted summary judgments
for both defendants, and the court of appeals had affirmed in 211 Ga. App. 795, 440 S.E.2d
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the historical stage for the issues presented, the court focused upon the
famous 1991 amendment to the constitution.265 That amendment, the
court held, expressly confers sovereign immunity upon counties,26 ' an
immunity only the general assembly is empowered to waive.267 The
legislature has expressly waived that immunity, the court continued, to
the extent of the amount of liability insurance the county purchased "for
the negligence of its officers, . . . arising from the use of a motor

vehicle." 268 Moreover, the court held, the county's authorized particivehicle] soverpation in a county insurance pool 26 9 "waived its [motor
270

eign immunity to the extent of its liability coverage."
As for the defendant deputy, the court interpreted the 1991 amendment to "provide [official] immunity for the negligent performance of

684 (1994). 264 Ga. at 745, 452 S.E.2d at 478.
265. 264 Ga. at 746, 452 S.E.2d at 478. See GA.CONsT. art. I, § 2, para. 9.

266. 264 Ga. at 747, 452 S.E.2d at 478. "[W]e hold the 1991 amendment's extension
of sovereign immunity to 'the state and its departments and agencies' must also apply to
counties." Id., 452 S.E.2d at 479.
267. "[W]e hold that sovereign immunity is waived by any legislative act which
specifically provides that sovereign immunity is waived and the extent of such waiver."
Id. at 748, 452 S.E.2d at 480.
268. Id. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (1990). For background on, and analysis of, this
statute, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort Liability Insurancein Georgia Local Goernment
Law, 24 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1973).
269. 264 Ga. at 751, 452 S.E.2d at 482; O.C.G.A. § 36-85-2(a) (1993). The court
explained that "[tlhrough its participation in GIRMA, [the county] is authorized to pool its
resources and liabilities with other member counties and jointly purchase general liability,
motor vehicle liability, or property damage insurance." 264 Ga. at 751 n.8, 452 S.E.2d at
482 n.8.
270. 264 Ga. at 751, 452 S.E.2d at 482. Although the GIRMA statute itself provides
that participation therein shall not waive immunity, in Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga.
129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992), the court invalidated that provision because of its conflict with
the Article I provision of the 1983 Constitution. Id. at 130, 414 S.E.2d at 648. Although
the 1991 amendment replaced that Article I provision without the previous conflicting
language, the court held that the replacement did not resurrect the void statute. 264 Ga.
at 751, 452 S.E.2d at 482. "A statute declared unconstitutional is deemed void from its
inception and is not revived merely because the constitutional infirmity is subsequently
eliminated." Id. For history and analysis of the "void from inception" doctrine in Georgia,
see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Unconstitutionalityin Georgia: Problems of Nothing, 8 GA. L.
REV. 101 (1974).
On the issue of "extent of waiver" by county motor vehicle insurance, in Mims v. Clanton,
215 Ga. App. 665, 452 S.E.2d 169 (1994)(decided under the 1983 version of Article I), the
court of appeals held that a county policy with a $250,000 deductible and a $750,000 limit
per occurrence, provided only partial waiver. The court remanded the case for a
determination on whether the county had established self-insurance for the first $250,000
of liability. Id. at 667, 452 at 171.
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discretionary acts."27' In rushing to an emergency call, the court held,
the deputy "was performing an official discretionary function when the
accident occurred and is immune from personal liability under the 1991
amendment."27
As for the sheriff's "respondeat superior" liability for the negligence of
his employee in performing an official function,273 the court held the
sheriff was "entitled to the benefit of [the county's] sovereign immunity
defense."274 Yet, "[s]ince... the county has waived sovereign immunity to the extent of its liability insurance coverage, [the sheriff's]
27 5
sovereign immunity defense is likewise waived to that extent."
The survey period's other decisions, all rendered by the court of
appeals, touched upon various facets of county responsibility. Even prior
26
to the supreme court's decision in Gilbert, Canfield v. Cook County
held counties immune to liability under the 1991 amendment.27 7 In
Canfield, an action for an accident on a county road, the coijrt of appeals
also rejected plaintiff's effort at liability in nuisance: "A county cannot
be liable for a nuisance except in thi context of a taking of private
property for public purposes amounting to inverse condemnation."2 78

271. 264 Ga. at 753, 452 S.E.2d at 483. The court explained that heretofore the
doctrine of "official immunity" had developed primarily through case law. See R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability In GeorgiaLocal Government Law: The HauntingHiatus
of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REv. 27 (1988). With the 1991 amendment, however, that
provision expressly treated the issue. Noting that it had not previously considered the
effect of this change, the court interpreted "the term 'official functions' to mean any act
performed within the officer's or employee's scope of authority, including both ministerial
and discretionary acts." 264 Ga. at 753, 452 S.E.2d at 483. "Under this definition, the
1991 amendment provides no immunity for ministerial acts negligently performed or for
ministerial or discretionary acts performed with malice or an intent to injure." Id.
272. 264 Ga. at 753, 452 S.E.2d at 483. Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge's grant
of summary judgment to the deputy under the doctrine of official immunity. Id.
273. Id. The court explained that "[ulnder the doctrine of respondeat superior, a
principal has no defense based on an agent's immunity from civil liability for an act
committed in the course of employment." Id. Thus, "[slince deputy sheriffs are employed
by the sheriff rather than the county, sheriffs may be liable in their official capacity for a
deputy's negligence in performing an official function." Id. at 754, 452 S.E.2d at 484.
274. Id.
275. Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment to the
sheriff. Id.
276. 213 Ga. App. 625, 445 S.E.2d 375 (1994).
277. Id. at 625, 445 S.E.2d at 375. Absent legislative authority, the court further
declared, liability insurance could not waive the immunity. Id.
278. Id. For history and analysis of county liability in nuisance, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REv. 1 (1991).
In two cases of the period, counties escaped liability simply because they had played no
part in bringing about the injury. In Watson v. Clayton County, 214 Ga. App. 225, 447
S.E.2d 162 (1994), a complaint that the county allowed the city to barricade and excavate
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Coffee County School District v. Snipes2 79 brought the liability focus

to bear upon county school districts and their employees." ° Closely
tracking Gilbert, the court of appeals held that, like counties, countywide school districts also enjoy the 1991 amendment's immunity."'
As for the employees, a teacher and teacher's aide supervising children
during recess, the court declared their functions to be "discretionpersonal liability under subsecary;" 28 2 thus, "they are immune from
2
tion (d) of the 1991 amendment." 1
The noteworthy issue of Tillman v.Mastin 4 went to plaintiffs
action under 42 U.S.C. § 198325 for a collision with a police officer
responding to an emergency call. 286 Following review of the requirements for section 1983 claims, the court concluded "that there was not
a showing that [the county] intentionally or deliberately promulgated or
even tolerated an impermissible or corrupt policy in its training of police
officers."28 7
Johnson v.Gwinnett County' served to remind that not all county
liability exemption derives from sovereign immunity. There, plaintiff
sued for the wrongful death of her son at the hands of the county's EMT
technicians,28 9 with the county pleading immunity under the Good

property, the court said none of the property was dedicated to the county nor did the
county have control over the city's work. In Hardy v. Candler County, 214 Ga. App. 627,
448 S.E.2d 487 (1994), an action for an accident on a road, the court held the case devoid
of evidence that the county owed any duty in respect to the road.
279. 216 Ga. App. 293, 454 S.E.2d 149 (1995).
280. Id. at 293, 454 S.E.2d at 149. Plaintiff sued for injuries to his five-year-old child
who fell during a recess period in the school gymnasium. Id. at 293-94, 454 S.E.2d at 149.
281. Id. at 294, 454 S.E.2d at 150. "We conclude that the 1991 amendment extending
sovereign immunity 'to the state and all of its departments and agencies' includes countywide school districts... created pursuant to Art. VIII, sec. 5, para. 1 of the 1983 Georgia
Constitution." 216 Ga. App. at 294, 454 S.E.2d at 150.
282. 216 Ga. App. at 297, 454 S.E.2d at 152.
283. Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's denial of defendants' motion for
summary judgment. Id.
284. 216 Ga. App. 3, 453 S.E.2d 85 (1994). Other issues decided included the county's
immunity under the 1983 Article I provision because it had no liability insurance, and the
police officer's immunity for discretionary acts. Id.
285. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
286. 216 Ga. App. at 3, 453 S.E.2d at 86. For history, treatment, and analysis of this
famous federal statute in the Georgia local government context, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAWS ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE
NEw "PERSONS" (1984).

287. 216 Ga. App. at 4, 453 S.E.2d at 87. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
grant of summary judgments for defendants. Id.
288. 215 Ga. App. 79, 449 S.E.2d 856 (1994).
289. Id.at 79,449 S.E.2d at 856. Plaintiff alleged the technicians' negligent treatment
of her son in rendering care to him, mistakenly inserting a tube into his esophagus instead
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Samaritan Immunity Statute.2" The court agreed not only that the
Statute covered the case, but also declared its immunity unaffected by
the existence of county liability insurance.29 1
The period's nonimmunity cases included Landis v. Rockdale
County,292 complaining of a deputy sheriff's failure to arrest a noticeably intoxicated driver who subsequently caused an accident fatal to
plaintiff's decedent. 2' 3 Basing its treatment of nonfeasance duty upon
the supreme court's decision in City of Rome v. Jordan,' the court of
appeals searched for the necessary "special relationship."2 9 ' Noting the
absence of any connection between the deputy and the decedent, 29 6 the
court turned to the deputy's relation to the intoxicated driver. That
relation, the court reasoned, entailed the duty of enforcing the drunk
driving laws only "to the public in general, not specifically to plaintiff's
decedent."297 Accordingly, the court held that defendants violated no

of his trachea. Id.
290. O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8(a) (1991). The statute relieves persons licensed to furnish
ambulance service, and who in good faith render emergency care to others, from the
responsibility of civil damages caused by their acts or omissions. Id.
291. 215 Ga. App. at 80, 449 S.E.2d at 857. The court analogized to its decision to the
same effect regarding punitive damages, Hospital Auth. of Clarke County v. Martin, 210
Ga. App. 893, 438 S.E.2d 103 (1993), affd, 264 Ga. 626, 449 S.E.2d 827 (1994).
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge's award of summary judgment to the county.
215 Ga. App. at 80, 449 S.E.2d at 857.
292. 212 Ga. App. 700, 445 S.E.2d 264 (1994).
293. Id. at 700, 445 S.E.2d at 264. For purposes of defendants' motion for summary
judgment, the court assumed that the intoxicated driver approached the deputy and spoke
to him while he was directing traffic at an intersection, that the deputy failed to restrain
the driver, and that two hours later, after leaving a party, the driver caused the fatal
accident. Id. Plaintiff sued the county, the sheriff, and the deputy. Id.
294. 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993). This was done pursuant to direction from the
supreme court when it remanded the court of appeals previous decision in Landis, 206 Ga.
App. 876, 427 S.E.2d 286 (1992).
295. 212 Ga. App. at 701, 445 S.E.2d at 266. In City of Rome, the supreme court had
adopted the following three requirements for such a relationship: (1) the government's
explicit assurance that it would act on behalf of the injured party; (2) the government's
knowledge that inaction could lead to harm; and (3) the injured party's justifiable and
detrimental reliance upon the government's undertaking. 263 Ga. at 27-29, 426 S.E.2d at
861.
296. 212 Ga. App. at 701, 445 S.E.2d at 266. The court emphasized that "when the
deputy sheriff was confronted with the intoxicated driver, plaintiffs decedent was not an
identifiable victim in immediate danger of harm." Id. at 702, 445 S.E.2d at 267.
297. Id.
Although the deputy may have been present at the scene of a crime in that he
observed an intoxicated driver, the deputy's duty to enforce the drunk driving laws
was to the public in general, not specifically to plaintiff's decedent, who was killed
hours later in a collision with the intoxicated driver at another location.
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duty "for which they could be held liable in tort for the plaintiff's
claims."29
In Thompson v. Payne, 99 the court found itself laboring under yet
another recent supreme court negligence formulation. Thompson
featured a motorist's complaint at being struck on the highway by both
a pursuing deputy and the fleeing suspect; plaintiff sued both the deputy
and his superior, the county sheriff."
The court expressly engaged
the supreme court's recent analysis of "proximate cause" in Mixon v. City
of Warner Robins.s°'
Under that analysis, summary judgment for
defendants was proper only if the evidence demanded a finding that the
officer properly balanced the risk to other drivers when he pursued the
fleeing suspect. 3 2 This case failed that standard,0" the court held,
and "[it] remains for the jury to determine whether, under all the
circumstances and conditions, the officer's act ofpursuing the suspect's
vehicle (including his decision to initiate and continue the pursuit) was
performed
with the requisite due regard for the safety of all per3 °4
sons."

298. Id. at 705, 445 S.E.2d at 268-69. The court reasoned that the officer's "authority"
to arrest did not create an affirmative "duty" to arrest for purposes of a tort action. Id. at
704, 445 S.E.2d at 268. Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary
judgment for all defendants. Id. at 705, 445 S.E.2d at 269.
Presiding Judge Beasley, joined by Judge Cooper, dissented with the argument that this
case was not controlled by City ofRome which involved a relation between the government
and the plaintiff, but rather had been distinguished in City of Rome as involving unique
circumstances: "That is, it arises from the unique position, power, knowledge of the officer,
and foreseeability, to prevent the tort." Id. at 707, 445 S.E.2d at 270 (Beasley, P.J.,
dissenting).
299. 216 Ga. App. 217, 453 S.E.2d 803 (1995).
300. Id. at 217, 453 S.E.2d at 804. The trial judge denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. Id.
301. 264 Ga. 385, 444 S.E.2d 761 (1994). In Mixon, only the fleeing suspect collided
with the plaintiff motorist. Id. at 385, 444 S.E.2d at 763.
302. 216 Ga. App. at 219, 453 S.E.2d at 805. The court said that in Mixon the supreme
court had relied on O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d) to conclude that "'an officer's performance of his
professional duty is not to be considered paramount to the duty that he owes to other
members of the driving public.'" 216 Ga. App. at 219, 453 S.E.2d at 805. See O.C.G.A.
§ 40-6-6(d) (1984 & Supp. 1995).
303. 216 Ga. App. at 219, 453 S.E.2d at 805.
We conclude that the evidence in this case, construed in favor of the plaintiff on
[defendant's] motion for summary judgment, does not demand a finding that [the
deputy] properly balanced the risk to the safety of other drivers and that in his
pursuit of the fleeing suspect he acted with due regard for the safety of other
drivers.
Id.
304. Id. (emphasis in original). The court thus affirmed the trial judge's denial of
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id.
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G. Zoning
Few local government functions are as controversial, or complex, as
that of zoning. A recurring issue goes to the remedies available to
property owners when zoning authorities fail fully to implement courtordered rezoning. Alexander v. DeKalb County 5 raised that issue
when the county, although complying with a court order to increase
apartment units per acre, then imposed conditions limiting the
increase. 3" Overruling a prior decision restricting available remedies
to criminal contempt or exemption from all zoning laws, 0 7 the supreme court proffered two others: civil contempt.. and a constitutional challenge to the new zoning classification.
The court admitted to making additional new law in Banks County v.
Chambers of Georgia,31 ° seeking mandamus for county verification that
The
plaintiffs' proposed landfill complied with zoning ordinances.3
court formulated "the question of first impression" as follows: "Does an

305. 264 Ga. 362, 444 S.E.2d 743 (1994).
306. Id. at 363,444 S.E.2d at 744. The owners of property zoned to 18 apartment units
per acre sought a rezoning to 30 units per acre. Id. Upon the trial court's invalidation of

its refusal to rezone, the county did rezone to a classification permitting 30 units but
imposed a condition (density) which limited development to 22 units per acre, Id. The
trial judge then ruled that the county had rezoned as ordered and that its conditions were
reasonable. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 745.
307. Id. at 364, 444 S.E.2d at 745. The discarded case was Fulton County v. Wallace,
260 Ga. 358, 393 S.E.2d 241 (1990). Here in Alexander, the court explained that "Ulust as
the remedy of declaring property free of all zoning restrictions is too drastic in most zoning
cases, we find the remedy of holding county commissioners in criminal contempt is also too
harsh in many cases." 264 Ga. at 363, 444 S.E.2d at 745.
308. 264 Ga. at 364, 444 S.E.2d at 745. "As part of our continuing 'search for safer
alternatives,' we hold that the contempt remedy in zoning cases to encourage compliance
with a previous court order is civil in nature." Id.
309. Id. "ITihe dissatisfied property owners may challenge the constitutionality of the
new zoning classification in superior court." Id. at 364-65, 444 S.E.2d at 745.
Here the court sustained the trial judge's decision that the county had complied with its
rezoning order, but invalidated the county's conditions: "We remand to enable the trial
court to vacate the two conditions banning variances." Id. at 365, 444 S.E.2d at 746.
Presiding Justice Benham did not participate in the decision, and Justice Carley
dissented, arguing that "the case should be reversed in its entirety and remanded to the
superior court for the additional purpose of determining whether the other ten conditions
should also be vacated." Id. at 366, 444 S.E.2d at 746 (Carley, J., dissenting).
310. 264 Ga. 421, 444 S.E.2d 783 (1994).
311. Id. at 421,444 S.E.2d at 785. Plaintiffs were in compliance when they first sought
written verification under the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 12-8-24(g), the county would not
then issue the verification, the plaintiffs filed an action in mandamus, and the county then
adopted a new zoning ordinance. 264 Ga. at 422, 444 S.E.2d at 785. See O.C.G.A. § 12-824(g) (1993 & Supp. 1995).
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applicant for a proposed solid waste landfill have a vested right to
written verification of compliance with local zoning ordinances if he is
in compliance with such ordinances when he first requests written
verification?"3 12 Examining prior decisions,"' the court answered the
question in the affirmative3 14 and thus affirmed the trial judge's
mandamus of verification.3 15
The court of appeals dealt with writs of mandamus and proposed
landfills in Butts County v. Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc.""6 There, the
court took issue with the county's interpretation of the Georgia
Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act. 1' In refusing verification of plaintiff's proposed landfill, the county had erred in considering
the proposed site's "negative impact" on its effort to reduce solid waste
disposition.1 ' Rather, the court announced, "we hold that a local
jurisdiction can only identify a site as unsuitable for a solid waste
facility based on environmental and land use factors, not based on the
fact that such a facility might increase the amount of waste disposed of
in the county."3 9 Otherwise, the court reasoned, "a county could meet
the waste reduction goal simply ...

by shipping all its solid waste to

312. 264 Ga. at 421, 444 S.E.2d at 785.
313. See, e.g., Gifford-Hill & Co. v. Harrison, 229 Ga. 260, 191 S.E.2d 85 (1972); WMM
Properties, Inc. v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436, 339 S.E.2d 252 (1986).
314. 264 Ga. at 421, 444 S.E.2d at 785. "We answer this question affirmatively." Id.
315. Id. at 422, 444 S.E.2d at 786. "Plaintiffs were in compliance with the County's
zoning ordinances when they sought written verification of compliance on August 20, 1991.
It follows that plaintiffs have a vested right to obtain written verification of zoning
compliance despite the enactment of the September 26, 1991, zoning ordinance." Id. at
423, 444 S.E.2d at 786.
Chief Justice Hunt and Justice Carley concurred only in the judgment, and Justice
Sears-Collins dissented without opinion. Id. at 424, 444 S.E.2d at 787.
Justice Hunstein dissented with an opinion which charged the majority with applying
the "minority rule" in the situation at hand and urged application of the "majority rule"
which requires that the landowners do more than merely apply for a permit or prerequisite
to such a permit once they have knowledge of pending zoning changes at the time of their
application. Id. at 425, 444 S.E.2d at 787-88 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
316. 213 Ga. App. 510, 445 S.E.2d 294 (1994).
317. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-8-20 to -164 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
318, 213 Ga. App. at 511, 445 S.E.2d at 295.
319. Id. at 512, 445 S.E.2d at 296. The part of the Act under dispute was O.C.G.A.
§ 12-8-21(c) which the court treated as follows:
We therefore construe the statutory requirement that local governments
implement programs to reduce the solid waste received at their disposal facilities
as a method both to achieve the state-wide goal of 25 percent waste reduction and
to measure the rate at which waste is being reduced; it is not, contrary to [the
county's] claim, a means by which local governments can refuse the presence of
solid waste handling facilities.
213 Ga. App. at 511, 445 S.E.2d at 295; see also O.C.G.A. § 12-21(c) (1992 & Supp. 1995).

1995]
other counties." 32 0

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
The court thus approved the trial judge's consider-

ation of environmental and land use factors and affirmed mandamus of
county verification that plaintiff's site was consistent with a multijurisdictional solid waste management plan.321
The supreme court proved far less receptive to mandamus in the
distinctly different zoning context of DeKalb County v. Publix Super
Markets, Inc.3 2 There, the fifteen-acre parcel of land in issue was
323
zoned four acres "commercial" and eleven acres "office-institutional."
Plaintiffs' proposed commercial shopping center designated the four-acre
portion as the location of its food store and the remaining area for
parking.2 Emphasizing that the county zoning ordinance prohibited
"placing accessory parking for a C-1 use in a 0-1 zoning district,"3 25 the
court rejected plaintiff's position "that there is a clear legal right to
approval."32 6 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial judge's issuance
of mandamus. 27
Dick v. Williams"~ projected the court of appeals into a consideration of ethics in local government zoning. Dick invalidated the county
commissioners' grant of a rezoning application when the applicants were
represented by the law partner of a commissioner's son. 329 Holding the
county ethics code to govern the matter,3 0 the court emphasized that
code's prohibition of "the appearance of impropriety."3 1

"Clearly," the

320. 213 Ga. App. at 511,445 S.E.2d at 295. "Solid waste reduction cannot be achieved
simply by shipping the waste elsewhere; rather, as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 12-8-21(b), the
appropriate manner for reducing solid waste is 'through source reduction, reuse,
composting, recycling, and other methods.'" 213 Ga. App. at 511-12, 445 S.E.2d at 295.
321. 213 Ga. App. at 514,445 S.E.2d at 297. The court explained that plaintiff had "no
other specific legal remedy for protecting its right." Id.
322. 264 Ga. 739, 452 S.E.2d 471 (1994).
323. Id. at 740, 452 S.E.2d at 471.
324. Id. at 741, 452 S.E.2d at 472, Plaintiff submitted a preliminary plat and permit
development application, the county disapproved on grounds of noncompliance with its
ordinances, plaintiff filed the mandamus action, and the trial court issued the mandamus.
Id. at 740-41, 452 S.E.2d at 472.
325. Id. at 742, 452 S.E.2d at 473. The court observed that a curb-cut proposal was
prohibited by ordinance as well. Id. at 741, 452 S.E.2d at 472.
326. Id. The court disagreed with the trial judge's determination that cross-district
parking was not prohibited by the county ordinance. Id. at 743, 452 S.E.2d at 474.
327. Id.
328, 215 Ga. App. 629, 452 SoE.2d 172 (1994).
329. Id. at 629, 452 S.E.2d at 172. The rezoning application sought a rezoning from
"Office & Industrial" to "Office High Rise." Id., 452 S.E.2d at 174.
330. Id. at 631, 452 S.E.2d at 175. Rejecting defendants' contention that the matter
was controlled by state law, the court said "that state law provides a floor and not a ceiling
for the boundaries of ethical conduct by government officials." Id.
331. Id.
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court asserted, "an appearance of impropriety was created by [the
commissioner] acting on an application where the applicants were
represented by his son's law partner."332 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the trial judge's remand of the case for rehearing by the
commissioners without the participation of the offending member. 3
H.

Authorities
The county hospital authority suffered litigation in both appellate
courts. In Martin v. Hospital Authority of Clarke County,3" the
supreme court reaffirmed and extended the exemption of governmental
entities from punitive damages. The court anchored that exemption
firmly in "our state's public policy," 35 and viewed punitive damages in
this setting to serve no valid purpose.3 ' That same rationale, moreover, rendered the exemption oblivious to the hospital authority's
insurance against punitive damages.33 7 The court maintained that
"the existence of insurance and the issue of sovereign immunity simply
have no bearing in this case." 38
On the point of sovereign immunity itself, the court of appeals
employed Randolph County Hospital Authority v.Johnson339 to adopt

332. Id. The court also rejected defendants' contention that the commissioner's son was
given no role and no compensation in the part of the practice dealing with county zoning:
Lawyers practicing in the same firm should not be allowed to create multiple legal
entities and parcel their clients among them in order to circumvent an otherwise
existing conflict, and it necessarily follows that they should not be able to do so
in order to allow some lawyers in the firm to have an "interest" in a particular
matter while others do not.
Id. at 632, 452 S.E.2d at 176.
333. Id.
334. 264 Ga. 626, 449 S.E.2d 827 (1994).
335. Id. at 626, 449 S.E.2d at 828. The court relied upon MARTA v. Boswell. 261 Ga.
427, 405 S.E.2d 869 (1991), which had adopted the rationale of City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 264 Ga. at 626, 449 S.E.2d at 828.
336. 264 Ga. at 626, 449 S.E.2d at 828. The court reasoned that "punitive damages are
not appropriate against governmental entities because neither of the twin purposes behind
punitive damages-punishment and deterrence-is served by an assessment of those
damages against [governmental] entities." Id.
337. Id. at 627, 449 S.E.2d at 828-29. "[Tjhe public policy prohibiting punitive damage
awards against governmental entities stands on independent grounds unaffected by the
existence of insurance coverage." Id.
338. Id., 449 S.E.2d at 829. Justice Carley, joined by Justice Thompson, dissented on
the ground that "the public policy of this state should not be extended to protect the purely
private interest of an insurer who has contracted to afford liability coverage to a
governmental entity against whom punitive damages are sought." Id. at 631, 449 S.E.2d
at 831 (Carley, J., dissenting).
339. 215 Ga. App. 283, 450 S.E.2d 318 (1994). This was a wrongful death action
against the hospital authority with the trial judge denying the defendant's motion for
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the supreme court's recent approach." ° A hospital authority, the court
reasoned, although an instrument of government, is not an "agency or
department
of the state" within the constitution's conferral of immuni41
3

ty.

Finally, plaintiff in Atlanta Airmotive, Inc. v. Royal 342 sought to
impose personal liability upon members of the county airport authority.3 43 Relying exclusively upon the "supplemental immunity" statutorily provided for members of local government authorities, 44 the court
affirmed summary judgment for the defendants.~' 5 Under that statute,
the court asserted, the members' immunity did not turn upon the
"ministerial-discretionary" dichotomy,3 46 as long as their actions were
taken in good faith and within the scope of their official duties.3 47 The
court rejected plaintiff's argument that defendants' acts fell outside their
official duties because they violated the Open Meetings Act." s Such
violations, the court reasoned,
would not strip the actions of their
3 49
"official duty" characteristic.
III. LEGISLATION
Although space limitations preclude adequate presentation, a few local
government products of the 1995 legislative session might be mentioned.

summary judgment on grounds of sovereign immunity. Id. at 283, 450 S.E.2d at 318.
340. Id. The supreme court held hospital authorities devoid of sovereign immunity in
Thomas v. Hospital Auth. of Clarke County, 264 Ga. 40, 440 S.E.2d 195 (1994), reviewed
in last year's survey: R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 46 MERCER L. REv. 363,
396 (1994). For a full and earlier history of the issue, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Sue and
Be Sued' in GeorgiaLocal Government Law: A Vignette of Vicissitudes, 41 MERCER L. REV.
13 (1989).
341. 215 Ga. App. at 283, 450 S.E.2d at 319; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9.
342. 214 Ga. App. 760, 449 S.E.2d 315 (1994).
343. Id. at 760, 449 S.E,2d at 316. Plaintiff lessee of a part of the county airport sued
the airport authority members for terminating its lease, claiming personal liability for tort
damages caused by alleged malicious interference with plaintiffs business. Id.
344. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-20 (1982 & Supp. 1995). Because of reliance upon this statute,
the court did not determine the issue of the members' "official immunity." 214 Ga. App.
at 761, 449 S.E.2d at 317.
345. 214 Ga. App. at 761, 449 S.E.2d at 317.
346. Id.
347. Id. Further, damages must not be the result of willful or wanton misconduct. Id.
348. Id. at 762, 449 S.E.2d at 317; O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1994).
349. 214 Ga. App. at 762,449 S.E.2d at 317. Although not deciding whether in fact the
members had violated the Open Meetings Act, "it does not follow that any actions taken
by Authority members which may have violated the Open Meetings Act lost their character
as actions taken within the scope of the members' official duties for purposes of the
immunity provided by O.C.G.A. § 51-1-20." 214 Ga. App. at 762, 449 S.E.2d at 317.
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Apparently reacting to a recent decision by the Georgia Supreme
Court,35 ° the general assembly set a proximate cause standard for
police officers who pursue fleeing suspects." 1 Unless the officer acts
"with reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures," the
officer's conduct may not be deemed the proximate cause of the suspect's
injury to other persons."'
A legal liability concern at the county level led to yet another
innovative measure. The new statute authorizes a county officer, sued
in a civil or criminal action, to petition for court order of a personal
attorney.6 This may be done only when the county agrees to provide
a defense in lieu of insurance and when an ethical conflict of interests
prevents the county attorney from representing the petitioning
officer.354
Continuing the focus upon individual officers, two statutes loosened
prohibitions upon service. One of these eliminates the requirement that
a municipal court judge reside in the same judicial circuit as that in
which the court is located."' The other measure removes the prohibition against directors of development
authorities being officers or
356
employees of a county or municipality.
An effort to bring some order to the legal world of local government
authorities materialized in a statute requiring their annual registration
with the Department of Community Affairs. 57 The Department will
establish registration fees and regulations and provide a certified list of
registered authorities.3 ' Failure to register shall preclude an authority from incurring new debt.359
Manifesting yet another concern with indebtedness, a new statute
focuses upon a local governing body's legal advertisements of bond

350. See Mixon v. City of Warner Robins, 264 Ga. 385, 444 S.E.2d 761 (1994); see also
Thompson v. Payne, 216 Ga. App. 217, 453 S.E.2d 803 (1995).
351. Ga. H.R. Bill 409, Reg. Sess, (1995).
352. Id. Only if the officer so acts may a jury consider whether the officer is the
"proximate cause" of the injury. Id. Additionally, the statute increases significantly the
criminal penalties for convicted fleeing suspects. Id.
353. Ga. H.R. Bill 605, Reg. Sess. (1995).
354. Id. In those circumstances, the officer must first request, and be denied, a
personal attorney from the county governing authority. Any legal fees paid to a courtappointed personal attorney are limited to fees paid the county attorney or to a schedule
of fees paid outside attorneys by the governing authority. Id.
355. Ga. H.R. Bill 301, Reg. Sess. (1995),
356. Ga. S. Bill 132, Reg. Sess. (1995).
357. Ga. H.R. Bill 250, Reg. Sess. (1995).
358. Id. The statute specifies the information which the registering authority must
provide to the Department. Id.
359. Id. Registrations are required to be made each January. Id.
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elections. 6 The statute requires the advertisement to state that any
other ads or brochures issued by the authority to promote bond financing
shall be statements of intention as to the use of the bond funds.""
Drawing impetus from recent statewide emergency experiences, a new
enactment seeks to control commercial exploitation of disaster victims.
The statute empowers local governments to adopt ordinances creating
emergency registration programs for businesses in disaster areas during
a declared state of emergency. 62 The measure further prohibits retail
to levels above prices charged in the
price increases on goods or services
3 63
area prior to the emergency.
Law enforcement refinements of the legislative session included a
statute empowering local governments to establish holding facilities for
juveniles.3 ' At these facilities, local law enforcement officers may
detain juveniles who have violated curfew ordinances or whose parents
have reported them absent. 65
More broadly, other new legislation authorizes local governments to
create regional jail authorities. 66 The authority is empowered to issue
bonds and utilize local option sales taxes and is to operate the regional
jail through a management committee composed of participating county
sheriffs.367
Local governments were armed anew with authority to enact business
taxes. 68 In order to exercise this optional power, the local government
must adopt a new business tax ordinance and may base the taxes on
number of employees, profitability, gross receipts, or a flat fee. 69
Although regulatory fees may be imposed, they may not be used to raise
revenue but must approximate the cost of the regulations. 7 0
Local governments also received additional authority in respect to
licensing the sales of alcoholic beverages. The local governing authority
is now empowered on its own to enact a resolution calling for a

360. Ga. H.R. Bill 417, Reg. Sess. (1995).
361.

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
taxes.
370.

Id.

Ga. H.R. Bill 283, Reg. Sess. (1995).
Id. The statute provides for a three-month recovery period in the area. Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 498, Reg. Sess. (1995).
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 345, Reg. Sess. (1995).
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 175, Reg. Sess. (1995).
Id. The statute makes it clear that no local government is required to impose the
Id
Id.
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referendum on allowing the government to issue licenses for the sale of
liquor by the drink.371
Motor vehicle tag registrations drew legislative attention via a statute
staggering registrations over a twelve-month period. 72 In the absence
of local legislation expressly exempting the county from the new system,
registrations will be pegged at the vehicle owner's birthdate.31 3 The
vehicle dealers from ad valorem taxation
statute further exempted motor
374

on vehicles held in inventory.

The legislature sought to foster economic development by enactment
of an accelerated foreclosure procedure for tax delinquent properties.3 7 5
The statute empowers local governments to create an in rem foreclosure
process, to establish criteria for such properties, and thus more promptly
to obtain a clear and marketable title for redevelopment purposes.376
Finally, the 1995 general assembly created the Georgia Future
Communities Commission. 377 That Commission is charged with
examining governmental, social, and economic issues facing local
governments and considering changes in local government structure
conducive to a good quality of life. 378 The Commission is to recommend

proposals "to ensure that all of 3Georgia's
local governments become
79
catalysts for economic prosperity."

IV. CONCLUSION
The law by which local governments regulate, and are regulated, is
law of inordinate importance. That law determines the quality of life,
no less, for a majority of Georgia's citizens. Little wonder that again
this year Georgia local government law stood in the cross hairs of public
scrutiny.

371. Ga. H.R. Bill 680, Reg. Sess. (1995). The statute continues the provision allowing
35% of the voters to petition for such a referendum, and requires that 35% of the voters
petition for an election to nullify a previous election allowing liquor sales. Id.
372. Ga. H.R. Bill 379, Reg. Sess. (1995).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Ga. S. Bill 338, Reg. Sess. (1995).
376. Id. Those having an interest in the properties will have twelve months following
the date when the taxes became delinquent in which to redeem the properties before this
procedure could begin. Id.
377. Ga. H.R. Res. 324, Reg. Sess. (1995).
378. Id. The Commission is to assess future implications of current negative trends in
local governments. Id.
379. Id. The Commission will be composed of legislators and representatives of local
governments. Id.

